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* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A., Wichita State University,
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VI. RENT AND SECURITY
A. Duty to Pay Rent
1. Existence of the duty
A leasehold may exist without the payment of rent, at least if the
parties expressly so agree. 41 8 Like other grants of interests in land, the
grant of a leasehold need not be supported by consideraton. Of course
rent normally is payable, so that the question is usually under what
conditions it is payable and by whom.
In many American jurisdictions and in England, by statute or by
decisional law, the duty to pay reasonable rent arises simply out of the
consensual occupation of another's land, without the need of finding
an express or implied agreement for rent.4 19 Washington's position is
not wholly clear. A couple of decisions, without facing the issue
head-on, suggest that permissive possession may be enough by it-
self.420 However, in another case a landowner was denied rent for the
time his mother had permissive occupation, the court saying there was
no "implied agreement" for it. 42 t If an implied agreement is required,
it may be found on very light evidence. The tenant's payment of
monthly rent in fluctuating amounts will create a duty to pay on a
quantum meruit basis.422 As we have already discussed, a "general let-
ting" upon payment of periodic rent in a fixed amount creates a ten-
ancy by the period of the rent, with rent due in the fixed amount. 423 A
landlord's demand for rent of one who previously occupied at will
rent-free creates a duty to pay rent from the date of demand. 424
By force of R.C.W. § 59.04.050, a trespasser, i.e., a nonpermissive
possessor, is liable to pay rent. 425 The statute transforms the trespasser
418. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.64 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter
cited as A.L.P.].
419. Id.
420. Davis v. Jones, 15 Wn. 2d 572, 131 P.2d 430 (1942): Blumberg v. H. H.
McNear & Co., I Wash. Terr. 141 (1861) (earliest reported landlord-tenant case in
Washington).
421. Woolen v. Sloan, 94 Wash. 551, 162 P. 985 (1917).
422. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Thrower. 155 Wash. 613. 285 P. 654 (1930).
423. See subsection 1l-C-2b, Stoebuck, The Law Between Landlord and Tenant in
Washington: Part I, 49 WASH. L. REV. 291 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Part I].
424. Davis v. Jones, 15 Wn. 2d 572, 131 P.2d 430 (1942) (no express demand.
but permission to occupy rent-free expired); Decker v. Verloop, 73 Wash. 10, 131
P. 190 (1913). Apparently rent becomes due in the amount demanded or, if no
amount is specified, in a reasonable amount.
425. In addition to the statute, see Howard v. Edgren. 62 Wn. 2d 884, 385 P.2d 41
(1963). and Williamson v. Hallett, 108 Wash. 176, 182 P. 940 (1919) (statute alterna-
tive basis for decision).
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into "a tenant by sufferance," who "shall be liable to pay reasonable
rent for the actual time he occupied the premises. . . ." Though this is
a strange kind of tenancy at sufferance,426 it is clear that rent is due.
As an alternative theory to the statute, it appears that a landowner
may create a duty to pay rent by demanding it of a trespasser.427 In-
terestingly, then, the trespasser's duty to pay rent is better settled than
is the duty of one who occupies permissively without-an agreement for
rent.
Leases generally contain some kind of language requiring the
tenant to pay rent. No express covenant is necessary, as long as the
intent is clear. Phrases such as "rent is to be paid," "rent is reserved,"
or "at an annual rent" are adequate to create the duty.428 Adequate
perhaps, but not careful drafting in Washington. Repeated dictum has
it that such phrases create only an "implied" promise of rent, so that if
the original tenant assigns the lease he relieves himself of any further
liability for rent.429 The moral is that every Ilease should contain ex-
press covenantal language by the tenant to pay rent in a stated sum.
Customarily, landlord and tenant agree that rent shall be paid in
advance at the beginning of the term or at the beginning of designated
segments of the term. In the absence of such an agreement, rent is not
due until the end of the term or of the designated segments.430 Even
when rent is payable in advance, there is some authority for saying
that the purchaser at a tax foreclosure sale, who is entitled to receive
rents, may collect them only at the end of rental periods during the
redemption period.431 The court's reasoning was that redemption
might occur during any rental period, in which event it would turn out
that the purchaser was entitled to rent for only part of the period. The
same result could be argued for in connection with a mortgage fore-
closure or with any foreclosure proceding where redemption is permit-
426. See discussion in Part I, subsection II-E-1, 49 WASH. L. REv. at 328.
427. Williamson v. Hallett, 108 Wash. 176, 182 P. 940 (1919) (alternative
ground).
428. National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P.2d 535 (1938)
("at an annual rent"); Johnson v. Goddard, 179 Wash. 493, 38 P.2d 208 (1934)
("is to be paid").
429. National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P.2d 535 (1938)
(dictum); Johnson v. Goddard, 179 Wash. 493, 38 P.2d 208 (1934) (dictum).
430. Bernard v. Triangle Music Co., I Wn. 2d 41, 95 P.2d 43 (1939); Kneeland
v. Aldrich, 63 Wash. 609, 116 P. 264 (1911) (dictum).
431. Byers v. Rothschild, 11 Wash. 296, 39 P. 688 (1895) (apparent holding).
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ted, and where the purchaser is entitled to rents until redemption oc-
curs.
432
2. Remedies for breach
The landlord has a spectrum of remedies, both common-law and
statutory, for his tenant's default in paying rent. He first has a
common-law action for breach of covenant, in which damages ordi-
narily are measured by the amount of unpaid rent.43 3 If the tenant
defaults without ever taking possession under the lease and if the land-
lord knows he has not taken possession, then, according to the old and
probably unsound decision in Oldfield v. Angeles Brewing & Malting
Co., 4 3 4 the landlord's damages are only the difference between the
agreed rent and the fair rental value. Oldfield was limited by a later
decision, holding that the landlord may recover the full amount of
unpaid rent if he does not know the tenant has failed to take posses-
sion. 435 When the lease contains a clause allowing the landlord a cer-
tain sum as liquidated damages for the tenant's default, a recovery for
unpaid rent will be restricted to that sum. 436 The statute of limitations
on an action for rent is six years under R.C.W. § 4.16.040(3), even if
the lease is oral. 437
In addition to these common-law remedies, Washington statutes
afford the landlord additional remedies. Probably the best known and
most used is the unlawful detainer action provided in R.C.W. Chapter
59.12, which will be discussed in Part XI infra under the heading
"Unlawful Detainer." For residential tenancies covered by the 1973
Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, the unlawful detainer remedy and
432. WASH. REV. CODE § 6.24.210 (1963); Security Say. & Loan Soc'y v. Dudley.
175 Wash. 50, 26 P.2d 384; 28 P.2d 276 (1933); Roberts v. State, 175 Wash. 154,
26 P.2d 903 (1933). In the absence of some agreement thereof, the mortgagee has
no right to receive rents unless, of course, he purchases at the foreclosure sale. Boston
& Spokane Realty Co. v. Franc I nv. Co., 112 Wash. 113, 191 P. 826 (1920).
433. Please observe that the text does not assume the tenant has quit the premises,
but merely that he has defaulted in paying rent. If the tenant also vacates, then we
may face questions connected with the subject of surrender. These questions, including
the one about the landlord's mitigation of damages, will be treated in Part XI infra
under the heading "Surrender."
434. 62Wash. 260, 113 P. 630(1911).
435. Greening v. Herres, 165 Wash. 470, 5 P.2d 992 (1931).
436. Mon Wai v. Parks, 43 Wn. 2d 562, 262 P.2d 196 (1953).
437. Marshall v. Nash, 165 Wash. 554, 5 P.2d 978 (1931). The court specifically
rejected the argument that three years was the limitation period under an oral lease.
I.e., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.040(3) (1963) controls, and not § 4.16.080(3) (1963).
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procedures are somewhat different than under R.C.W. Chapter 59.12.438
The 1973 Act also purports on its face to give the landlord new
remedies for nonpayment of rent, but upon closer analysis it appears
no substantial new remedy is provided. 439
Where the agreed rent does not exceed $40 per month, R.C.W.
Chapter 59.08 provides a special and summaiy form of unlawful
detainer action for default in paying rent. The filing and service of a
complaint constitutes a notice to pay rent or to vacate, and the trial
of the cause is to be held within 10 days after filing. Assuming he
makes out his case, the landlord will be awarded restitution of the
premises, double the rent due, and $200. Of course the statute has
become inconsequential, owing to a paucity, of $40-a-month leases.
Moreover, by the express language of the 1973 Residential Landlord-
Tenant Act, R.C.W. Chapter 59.08's procedure can no longer be used
for leases covered by the Act.440
Under R.C.W. § 59.04.040 the landlord may terminate the lease-
hold upon a default in rent by giving a 10-day notice to pay rent or
quit. If the tenant does neither, the landlord may remove him by an
ejectment action.441 This is a totally different proceeding than the
unlawful detainer action based on the three-day notice to pay rent or
quit. It would seem that unlawful detainer would nearly always be the
preferred action; so, R.C.W. § 59.04.040 must find little use. Also,
the latter procedure may not now be used for leases within the 1973
Residential Landlord-Tenant Act.442
The lease between the parties may give the landlord remedies upon
the tenant's default in rent, which remedies may include a power to
terminate the leasehold estate. If the tenant defaults and the landlord
438. Ch. 207, [1973] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess., codified as WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 59.18.010-.420, .900, 59.04.900, 59.08.900 (Supp. 1973). For the unlawful de-
tainer statutes under the Act, see id §§ 59.18.180, .370-.420 (Supp. 1973).
439. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.130, .160-.190 (Supp. 1973). The i"973 Act in
fact diminishes the remedies the landlord formerly had.
440. Id. § 59.08.900 (Supp. 1973).
441. Verline v. Hyssop, 2 Wn. 2d 141, 97 P.2d 653 (1940), a most curious deci-
sion. The court held that, after the tenant ignored the 10-day notice, the landlord
could eject him, basing its decision on REM. REV. STAT. § 812, now codified as WASH.
REV. CODE § 59.12.030 (1963), a part of the unlawful detainer act. That section does
not support the result, but WASH. REV. CODE § 59.04.040 (1963) does. However, the
latter statute, though in effect in 1940 and going back to the 1867 session laws, was
erroneously omitted by the compilers of Remington's Revised Statutes. So, the court
reached the right result on wrong authority. One suspects the judges knew there was a
10-day-notice procedure somewhere, but they just could not lay hands on the statute.
442. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.04.900 (Supp. 1973).
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elects to terminate, the tenant's holding becomes wrongful, and the
landlord has two statutory forms of ejectment action. First, under the
general ejectment and quiet title section, R.C.W. § 7.28.010, he may
regain possession. In order to do so, he must first make demand for
possession according to the old common-law practice, which required
the demand to be made before sundown on the day rent was due, no
other time being sufficient. 443 Or the landlord may rely upon R.C.W.
§ 7.28.250, which gives a special form of ejectment to landlords who
have a right to reenter after defaults in rent. No notice need be given
other than the bringing of the suit, but the tenant may defeat reentry
by paying the rental arrearages with interest and costs anytime before
judgment. 444
B. Estoppel to Deny Landlord's Title
Washington, in line with other jurisdictions, has recognized the
doctrine that in an action for rent a tenant is estopped to deny his
landlord's title. 445 In practical application this means that once a land-
lord-tenant relationship is established, it is irrelevant who had title.
The doctrine must be understood to have some limitations and qualifi-
cations, however. It speaks of title as it existed only at the commence-
ment of the leasehold. Thus, the tenant may defend by showing some
third person acquired the reversion at a point after commencement. 446
Nor is the tenant estopped to acquire title adverse to his landlord at an
execution or foreclosure sale and to set up this title. 447 Of course the
443. Petsch v. Willman, 29 Wn. 2d 136, 185 P.2d 992 (1947).
444. Id.
445. Port of Willapa Harbor v. Nelson Crab & Oyster Co., 15 Wn. 2d 515. 131
P.2d 155 (1942) (possibly dictum); Tryon v. Davis, 8 Wash. 106, 35 P. 598 (1894):
Hall & Paulson Furniture Co. v. Wilbur, 4 Wash. 644, 30 P. 665 (1892) (unlawful
detainer for nonpayment of rent). Port of Willapa Harbor was a suit for wharfage
against one who used the wharf with the plaintiffs permission. The court stated the
rule that a tenant may not deny his landlord's title and applied the rule against the
defendant, but the court's language leaves some doubt whether they regarded the
wharfing arrangement as a landlord-tenant relationship. The decisions cited in the
other footnotes in this section all recognize the rule in dictum. For the general Ameri-
can law on the subject, see I A.L.P. § 3.65. But see Laurelhurst Club, Inc., v. Backus.
161 Wash. 185, 296 P. 819 (1931), whose unique facts are not apt to be repeated
often.
446. See Wallace v. Thomas, 193 Wash. 582, 76 P.2d 1032 (1938); Atwood v.
McGrath, 137 Wash. 400, 242 P. 648 (1926).
447. Holzer v. Rhodes, 24 Wn. 2d 184, 163 P.2d 811 (1945) (tax sale); Twardus
v. Crewson, 182 Wash. 522, 47 P.2d 829 (1935) (tax sale); Atwood v. McGrath. 137
Wash. 400, 242 P. 648 (1926) (tenant purchased from purchaser at execution sale).
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tenant may attorn to a purchaser of the reversion and apparently may
do so in Washington simply by paying him the rent, though in some
jurisdictions more elaborate forms of attornment have been required. 448
C. Variable Rent Provisions
1. Percentage rent
In commercial leases of premises upon which goods will be sold, it
is common for all or, more often, part of the rent to be expressed in
terms of a percentage of gross or net sales. This form of rent allows
the landlord to share in the tenant's good (or bad) fortune at the de-
mised location and also provides a partial hedge against inflation. The
drafting of the percentage rental covenant and the accompanying
clauses that ought to be included in support of it is no job for an ama-
teur: Gross or net sales must be defined uncommonly precisely; the
tenant should be obliged to continue in a certain business; to some
extent the manner in which he conducts the business should be spelled
out; he should not be allowed to compete elsewhere with the business
he conducts on the leased premises; and the landlord must have the
privilege to inspect business records to verify sales. Other subjects may
be touched upon; the ones listed have been particular areas of trouble.
No one questions that percentage rental clauses are legally enforce-
able.449 Litigation usually deals with the interpretation of the clauses
or with what implications can be drawn from them. One persistent
issue throughout the country has been whether a percentage rental
covenant implies a further covenant by the tenant to keep his business
going during the full term. Washington has held such a covenant is
implied when the rent is solely a percentage of sales, with no fixed
minimum.450 This accords with most decisions elsewhere. When the
lease provides any substantial fixed minimum rent in addition to the
percentage rent, courts generally have refused to imply further cov-
enants to stay open for business or to conduct the business in a profit-
able manner; however, the Washington court seems not to have
448. Wallace v. Thomas, 193 Wash. 582, 76 P.2d 1032 (1938); 1 A.L.P. § 3.65.
449. 1 A.L.P. § 3.66. See also Shell Oil Co. v. Wright, 167 Wash. 197, 9 P.2d 106
(1932), in which a percentage rental clause was given a full, literal application, and
Cissna Loan Co. v. Baron, 149 Wash. 386, 270 P. 1022 (1928), where a percentage
rental provision was given a broad interpretation favorable to the landlord.
450. Reeker v. Remour, 40 Wn. 2d 519, 244 P.2d 270 (1952).
1021
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spoken on this point. The court has held that a percentage rental
clause does not imply a partnership or joint venture between landlord
and tenant. 45 1 And the well known decision in Cissna Loan Co. v.
Baron,4 52 holding that the tenant had to pay percentage rent on sales
made in adjoining but connected premises, evinces a favorable judi-
cial reception of the percentage rental technique.
2. Rent adjustment formulas
Anytime a leasehold has a term longer than that for which the par-
ties are willing to predict economic conditions, they ought to consider
some formula for periodically adjusting rent. Presumably, rent could
be pegged to some measure of real value, such as the cost-of-living
index. The few Washington cases on the subject mostly involve peri-
odic (e.g., quinquenial) readjustment based on appraisals. Such
clauses are enforceable as written, of course. 453 If the parties' ap-
praisers cannot arrive at a valuation figure, a court may fix it.4 54 A
clause requiring the rent to be adjusted upward to a "reasonable"
figure has been held definite enough to be enforced, though it is ob-
viously sloppy drafting. The specific holding is that the rent should be
raised to the reasonable rental, based upon the valuation of the land
in its condition when the leasehold began, excluding the value of ten-
ant's improvements. 4 55
D. Government Regulation of Rent
During the Second World War and in times of economic stress af-
terward, the federal government has imposed legislative ceilings on
rent; so have some states, most notably New York. The constitu-
tionality of these regulations has been upheld. 456 The Washington
Supreme Court has enforced both wartime and peacetime federal
rent-control acts. The two decisions found on the subject enunciate no
451. Gottlieb Bros., Inc. v. Culbertson's, 152 Wash. 205, 277 P. 447 (1929).
452. 149 Wash. 386, 270 P. 1022(1928).
453. See McMillan v. Great Northern Ry., 45 Wn. 2d 802, 278 P.2d 316 (1954):
Johnson v. Norman, 98 Wash. 331, 167 P. 923 (1917).
454. Thomas v. Citizen's Realty Co.. 114 Wash. 456, 195 P. 209 (1921) (by im-
plication).
455. Murray v. Odman, I Wn. 2d 481, 96 P.2d 489 (1939).
456. See I. A.L.P. § 3.69.
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significant principles of law, but they do seem to evince a certain dis-
taste for the federal controls.457
Perhaps this is the place to mention also what might be considered
a specialized, limited kind of rent control contained in the 1973 Resi-
dential Landlord-Tenant Act. Section 24 prevents what is known ge-
nerically as "retaliatory eviction" by the landlord, but it is really
broader than that, for it also proscribes rent increases and other acts.458
The landlord is forbidden to raise the rent, evict the tenant, etc., in
reprisal or retaliation for the tenant's "good faith" seeking of remedies
under the Act or complaining to a governmental agency about the
landlord's breach of any other statute, ordinance, or regulation that
governs maintenance or operation of the premises. If the landlord
does any of the forbidden acts within 90 days after the tenant seeks
remedies or complains, there is a "rebuttable presumption" that the
landlord acted in retaliation. 459 Though the landlord may rebut the
presumption by showing increased costs, additional improvements,
etc., as a practical matter, there is a ceiling on rent for the 90 days.
E. Agreements to Increase or Reduce Rent
We consider now the enforceability of an agreement modifying the
lease, increasing or reducing the amount of rent as originally fixed. All
the decisions found have dealt with agreements to reduce, and the
Supreme Court of Washington has usually, though not always, been
able to overcome the arguments against enforceability.
The first such argument may be that, if the original lease was re-
quired to be in writing or acknowledged, an informal modification is
void. We previously observed that this is the general rule,460 and it has
been held to be so specifically as to agreements to reduce rent.461 As to
rental payments that have actually been made at the modified rate, it
is no objection that the modification agreement was informal, for that
457. See Lundsten v. Largent, 49 Wn. 2d 40, 298 P.2d 488 (1956); Penchos v.
Ranta, 22 Wn. 2d 198, 155 P.2d 277 (1945).
458. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.240 (Supp. 1973).
459. Id. § 59.18.250.
460. See Part I, subsection II-B-4a, 49 WASH. L. REV. at 316.
461. Vance Lumber Co. v. Tall's Travel Shops, Inc., 19 Wn. 2d 414, 142 P.2d 904
(1943); Hansen v. Central Inv. Co., 10 Wn. 2d 393, 116 P.2d 839 (1941); City
Mortgage Co. v. Diller, 180 Wash. 499, 40 P.2d 164 (1935); Mclnnis v. Watsoh, 116
Wash. 680, 200 P. 578 (1921).
1023
Washington Law Review
much of it is said to be executed. 462 Also, an informal rent modifica-
tion agreement might be taken out of the operation of the statute of
frauds by the doctrine of estoppel or part performance. The one
Washington decision discovered on the point took an informal modifi-
cation out of the statute because the parties had complied with it for
"some time," which happened to be about three and a half years. 463
This is a rather liberal use of the estoppel-part performance doctrine,
though it seems in general that the doctrine should apply to the
making of informal modification agreements in ways similar to its ap-
plication to the making of original leases, a subject previously dis-
cussed. 464
Another problem with rental change agreements may be whether
they are supported by fresh consideration. Some form of new consid-
eration must be present, or the agreement is unenforceable. 465 Under
Washington decisions, sufficient consideration exists if the tenant
threatens to quit the premises and cease paying rent, but refrains from
doing so because of the agreement to reduce his rent.466 Presumably,
while the cases may not say it expressly, the tenant would have to
have a legal power to carry out his termination threat, else his re-
fraining would be neither legal benefit nor detriment.
Washington cases have identified a couple of situations in which
agreements affecting rent are not considered lease modification agree-
ments. One of these is where the parties agree to allow a delay in
paying rent, without any reduction in amount. This has been held to
be merely a waiver, which might be made informally.467 The other
situation is where the landlord makes an agreement separate from the
lease to refund part of the rent under certain conditions; the court has
held this to be an independent agreement and not a lease modifica-
tion. 468
462. Conlan v. Spokane Hardware Co., 117 Wash. 378. 201 P. 26 (1921)
(dictum).
463. Gattavara v. Cascade Petroleum Co., 27 Wn. 2d 263, 177 P.2d 894 (1947).
464. See Part I, subsection II-B-4c, 49 WASH. L. REV. at 319.
465. Seattle Inv. Syndicate v. West Dependable Stores. 177 Wash. 125. 30 P.2d
956 (1934) (mere payment and receipt of reduced rent not consideration).
466. Walker v. Myers, 166 Wash. 392. 7 P.2d 21 (1932) (implied holding): Con-
Ian v. Spokane Hardware Co., 117 Wash. 378, 201 P. 26 (1921).
467. Gabrielson v. Swinburne. 184 Wash. 242, 51 P.2d 368 (1935).
468. Smith v. Schade Brewing Co., 81 Wash. 20, 142 P. 455 (1914).
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F. Landlord's Liens and Distraint
1. General statutory lien for rent
R.C.W. § 60.72.010 gives the landlord a limited lien, with some
exceptions, for rent "upon personal property which has been used or
kept on the rented premises by the tenant." No writing or recording is
necessary to create or to perfect the lien. It is, however, limited to a
total amount of two months' rent,469 which has become, or will be-
come, payable within two months of the date the action to foreclose
the lien is commenced. 470 The lien may be enforced by foreclosure in
the manner in which personal property liens are foreclosed, either by
the summary procedure of R.C.W. Chapter 60.10, or by the judicial
foreclosure of R.C.W. Chapter 61.12. 471 When a statutory receiver
has been appointea-.for the tenant, the filing of the lien claim with the
receiver apparently fs an acceptable substitute for foreclosure, 472 but
not when there is only a common-law assignment to a receiver. 473
There are limitations on the kinds of chattels covered by the lien. It
does not apply to the contents of a dwelling, i.e., not to leases of
dwellings.474 With other leases, the lien of course covers chattels owned
by the tenant himself and kept or used on the demised premises.475 It
also covers third persons' goods kept or used there by the tenant, "ex-
cept property of third persons delivered to or left with the tenant for
storage, repair, manufacture, or sale, or under conditional bills of sale
duly filed. '47 6 The "conditional bills of sale" language has given rise
469. Sun Realty Co. v. Dorhmann Hotel Supply Co., 156 Wash. 298, 286 P. 842
(1930). See also Kohout v. Brooks, 185 Wash. 4, 52 P.2d 905 (1935). There had pre-
viously been dictum that the lien could be for a total of four months' rent in Rosen-
thal v. Moses, 144 Wash. 346, 258 P. 7 (1927). Sun Realty questioned Rosenthal on
that point. The statute, not a model of clarity, says the lien may be for "two months'
rent due or to become due."
470. Darst v. Norton, 173 Wash. 399, 23 P.2d 410 (1933); Culp v. McMehan,
123 Wash. 499, 212 P. 1069 (1923).
471. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.72.040 (Supp. 1973). See also Kohout v. Brooks, 185
Wash. 4, 52 P.2d 905 (1935).
472. Darst v. Norton, 173 Wash. 399, 23 P.2d 410 (1933); United Cigar Stores
Co. v. Florence Shop, 171 Wash. 267, 17 P.2d 871 (1933) (dictum).
473. United Cigar Stores Co. v. Florence Shop, 171 Wash. 267, 17 P.2d 871
(1933).
474. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.72.010 (1963); Allen v. Hannaford, 138 Wash. 423,
244 P. 700 (1926).
475. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.72.010 (1963); Carpenter v. Lent, 185 Wash. 458,
56 P.2d 157 (1936).
476. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.72.010 (1963).
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to conflicting decisions, though no one seems aware of it. Allen v.
Griffin,4 77 in 1925, held, upon a strained course of reasoning, that
the statute allowed a lien only on goods sold by, not to, the tenant on
conditional sale. Practically, this would destroy the lien, for goods
sold by the tenant would generally be taken from the tenant's premises
by the vendee and for that reason would not be subject to the lien.
However, two later decisions held that landlords' liens did attach to
goods sold to the tenant and used on the premises where the contracts
were not properly filed.478 Of course Allen was not overruled, nor
even cited.
A landlord's rent lien is preferred to "all other liens except liens for
taxes, general and special liens of labor, and liens of mortgages duly
recorded prior to the tenancy. '4 79 It has been decided that "liens of
labor" does not refer to a laborer's preferred claim in receivership,
that not being a "lien," so that the landlord's lien is preferred to the
laborer's claim.48 0 A question that may have to be decided is how the
phrase "mortgages duly recorded" fits in with the terminology and
concepts of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 481
If chattels covered by the lien are destroyed by fire or the elements
and the tenant thereby receives insurance proceeds, the lien attaches
to the proceeds. It remains on items the tenant sells to persons who
know of his tenancy and who are not customers in the regular course
of his business.4 82 On goods that are removed from the leased prem-
ises, the lien survives for 10 days. This means the landlord will lose
his lien on such goods unless he commences foreclosure proceedings
within the 10-day period.48 3
2. Statutory crop lien
By force of R.C.W. § 60.12.020, the landlord of agricultural land
may obtain a lien on the tenant's crops for that year, to secure not
477. 132 Wash. 466, 232 P. 363 (1925).
478. Harrison v. National Cash Register Co., 196 Wash. 83, 82 P.2d 136 (1938):
Schneider v. Harold H. Schultz, Inc., 188 Wash. 56, 61 P.2d 990 (1936).
479. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.72.010 (1963). See also M.H.B. Co. v. Desmond,
151 Wash. 344. 275 P. 733 (1929).
480. Darst v. Norton, 173 Wash. 399, 23 P.2d 410 (1933).
481. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 62A.9 (1963).
482. Id.§ 60.72.010(1963).
483. Id.; Seattle Lodge No. 211, Loyal Order of Moose v. Par-T-Pak Beverage
Co., 55 Wn. 2d 587, 349 P.2d 229 (1960): United Cigar Stores Co. v. Florence Shop.
171 Wash. 267, 17 P.2d 871 (1933).
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only the rent, but also the performance of all duties under the lease,
falling due in that same year. This is really more than a lien for rent,
since it also secures "the faithful performance of the terms of the
lease. '484 The lien will follow the crop into the hands of a warehouse-
man, even if the warehouseman has issued negotiable receipts that have
been negotiated to third persons.485 In order for the lien to follow the
crops upon sale, the landlord must have perfected it before the sale in
the manner to be described. 486 The landlord may also release his lien
by consenting to a sale and receiving part of the sale price.487
To perfect his crop lien the landlord must either have recorded his
lease in the county auditor's office or he must record a claim of lien. 488
If he has a recorded lease, that constitutes a notice of lien for rent
only, for the first three years of the lease, without any further record-
ing.489 However, still assuming the lease is recorded, to make the lien
cover damages for the tenant's breach of covenants other than for
rent, the landlord must also record a special claim for damages, ap-
parently within 20 days after the claim accrues.490 In case there is no
written, acknowledged lease to record, or if there is one but it is not
recorded, then the landlord must perfect his lien by filing a claim of
lien in the auditor's office by June 1st of the year in which he claims
the lien. 491 This claim of lien is good for both rent defaults and dam-
ages flowing from other breaches.
484. McLeod v. Russell, 59 Wash. 676, 110 P. 626 (1910), seems to provide an
example. The lease required the tenant to pay for the use of certain personal items
used on the farm, as well as to pay rent. In concluding that the lien covered both pay-
ments, the court noted that the statutory lien secured the performance of obligations
beside rent.
485. Ankeny v. Pomeroy Grain Growers, Inc., 170 Wash. 1, 15 P.2d 264 (1932);
State ex rel. Pacific Coast Elevator Co. v. Superior Court, 169 Wash. 247, 13 P.2d 900
(1932) (warehouse receipts issued).
486. Chute v. Brown, 103 Wash. 364, 174 P. 438 (1918). When this case was de-
cided, the lien recording procedure was different than it is now, but that should not
change the proposition for which the decision is here cited.
487. Banning v. Livesley, 87 Wash. 580, 152 P. 4 (1915).
488. WAsH. REV. CODE § 60.12.040 (1963).
489. Id.; Ankeny v. Pomeroy Grain Growers, Inc., 170 Wash. 1, 15 P.2d 264
(1932).
490. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.12.040 (1963) is a bit ambiguous. It says the special
claim "must be recorded within the time, and in the manner hereinabove in this sec-
tion provided." The reference is back to the procedure for recording labor liens
against crops, which must be done "within twenty days, after the cessation of the
work or labor."
491. Id. § 60.12.040 (1963). American State Bank v. Sullivan, 134 Wash. 300,
235 P. 815 (1925), holds, as an alternative ground of decision, that the lien claim
may be filed even if there is no written lease.
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Once perfected, the landlord's crop lien endures for eight months
"after the claim [is] filed," except that a claim filed against next year's
crop after the ground is prepared or the crop sowed, endures for 12
months. 49 2 The statute, drafted to cover other kinds of crop liens in
addition to landlords' liens, seems not to fit landlords' liens well, espe-
cially when the landlord relies upon a recorded lease that supposedly
gives a three-year lien notice. For example, R.C.W. § 60.12.040 says
that a landlord who claims damages under such a lease must record a
notice of his claim "within twenty days, after the cessation of the work
or labor . . . ." No decision has been found clarifying the situation.
A landlord's crop lien enjoys priority over any other encumbrance
on the crop except labor liens and seed liens. 493 Of course, the land-
lord may agree to subordinate his lien to some other encumbrance.
Moreover, in Deboe v. Prentice Package & Storage Co., the landlord
was held to be "estopped" to assert the priority of his lien when he
made no objection to the tenant's giving a chattel mortgage to secure
a loan necessary to harvest the crop, the landlord, tenant, and lender
all believing erroneously that the chattel mortgage would have legal
priority. 494 Although the decision appears to apply the principles of
estoppel awfully loosely, the peculiar facts ought to make it distin-
guishable as authority in other cases. If the landlord does subordinate
his lien to a security device for a loan, his lien will still attach to what
is left of the crop after the loan is satisfied.495
3. Distraint
Distraint (or distress) is a common-law privilege the landlord has to
seize the tenant's, or even third persons', chattels on the premises and
to hold them until rent is paid. Many American jurisdictions have al-
tered or abolished the practice by statute or by decision. Courts have
sometimes concluded that statutory rent liens or unlawful detainer
statutes have replaced distraint. 496
492. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.12.080 (1963).
493. Id. § 60.12.010 & .030 (1963). But see Haynes v. Pierson, 176 Wash. 611,
30 P.2d 644 (1934), which, under a former statute, gave the landlord's lien priority
over a seed lien. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.12.030 (1963) now says "'The seed lien pro-
vided for in this chapter shall be superior to any lien except a labor lien."
494. 172 Wash. 514,20 P.2d 1107 (1933).
495. Radford v. Washington Fruit & Produce Co.. 175 Wash. 444. 27 P.2d 702
(1933).
496. 1 A.L.P. § 3.72.
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The status of distraint in Washington is not fully known. It is ex-
pressly abolished by the 1973 Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, but
of course this applies only to those residential leaseholds covered by
the Act. 497 However, under the Act, where the tenant abandons the
leasehold and defaults in rent, the landlord may seize, hold, and even-
tually sell any of the tenant's goods found on the premises after proper
notice and failure of the tenant to demand possession.498 As to lease-
holds not under the 1973 Act, we simply do not know if distraint ex-
ists. Diligent search has failed to uncover a case or statute on the
question. One might take the position that, the common law being in
force in Washington until modifed, distraint exists. On the other side,
the existence of both statutory rent liens and statutory unlawful de-
tainer actions could be thrown up against it. Upon a broader level of
speculation, it seems doubtful that a court, as favorably disposed to-
ward tenants as the Supreme Court of Washington now is, 499 would
adopt a doctrine like distraint.
G. Security Devices
Landlords frequently wish to incorporate into their leases some de-
vice to enhance their legal and financial position should the tenant
default in his rent or otherwise breach the lease. The Washington
cases involve two general kinds of such devices: security deposits,
upon which there are several variants, and liquidated damages
clauses. While all these techniques can be made to work in Wash-
ington and while all may serve a similar purpose, significant differ-
ences in their operation may cause the well-advised landlord to opt for
a particular one. We will consider security deposits first, then liqui-
dated damages clauses.
1. Security deposits
Security deposit clauses have been found in three general forms.
First, the tenant may, at the commencement of the term, deposit a
sum of money or corporate securities with the landlord as "security"
497. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.230(4) (Supp. 1973).
498. Id. § 59.18.310.
499. See, e.g., Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wn. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973), and
McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wn. 2d 443,486 P.2d 1093 (1971).
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or as a "security deposit" for his faithful performance. The lease may
or may not expressly state that the deposit shall be refunded if the
tenant fully performs or that it shall be retained by the landlord if he
does not. With these kinds of arrangements, the landlord is entitled in
Washington to retain out of the deposit only so much as will compen-
sate him for his actual damages upon the tenant's breach. 500 In other
words, no part of the deposit becomes the landlord's until the breach;
this seems to be the crucial determination.
Second, the lease may provide that the deposit is paid as part con-
sideration for the lease, to be applied to rent at the latter end of the
lease if the tenant fully performs, but to be retained by the landlord if
he defaults. With a properly drafted clause of this type, under the ven-
erable authority of Dutton v. Christie and of more recent decisions,50 1
no part of such a deposit is refundable if the tenant breaches in
any manner. This implies, for one thing, that if he defaults in his rent,
the landlord may both retain the deposit and recover the unpaid rent.5 02
Here the crucial determination seems to be that the deposit became
the landlord's at the inception of the tenancy, to be credited back to
the tenant only on the condition of his "good behavior." Because of
limitations a later decision puts on Dutton v. Christie,50 3 if the land-
lord desires to retain the entire deposit, the lease should (1) recite in
the granting clause that the deposit is part of the consideration, (2)
state that the deposit now belongs to the landlord, (3) not allow the
tenant to receive income from, or retain any interest in, the deposit
and (4) have the deposit applicable on rent if the tenant fully per-
forms, but not have any of it refundable to his person. Another pos-
sible limitation, suggested by dictum in the most recent case on the
subject, is that a clause of this second type might be unenforceable if
contained in a standard-form lease for a dwelling.50 4
500. Exeter Co. v. Holland Corp., 172 Wash. 323, 20 P.2d 1. 23 P.2d 864 (1933)
(landlord has "lien" against deposit); Stern v. Green, 127 Wash. 429. 221 P. 601
(1923); Martin v. Siegley, 123 Wash. 683, 212 P. 1057 (1923).
501. J. & J. Food Centers, Inc. v. Selig, 76 Wn. 2d 304, 456 P.2d 691 (1969):
General Petroleum Corp. v. Harry Wright's, Inc., 166 Wash. 636, 8 P.2d 291 (1932):
Dutton v. Christie, 63 Wash. 372. 115 P. 856 (1911).
502. On this specific point, see Dutton v. Christie, 63 Wash. 372. 115 P. 856
(1911).
503. Compare Stern v. Green, 127 Wash. 429, 221 P. 601 (1923), with Dutton v.
Christie, 63 Wash. 372. 115 P. 856(1911).
504. J. & J. Food Centers, Inc., v. Selig, 76 Wn. 2d 304, 456 P.2d 691 (1969),
contains dictum that this type of deposit clause might be "unconscionable" if inserted
into a standard-form dwelling lease.
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The third identifiable kind of deposit clause has some of the charac-
teristics of the second. It simply provides that the tenant pays a certain
sum as advance rent for the latter part of the term, e.g., the last
month's rent. In this situation the sum belongs at once to the landlord.
Of course, if the tenant defaults in his rent, the landlord cannot both
retain the deposit and collect rent for the period the deposit covers. It
has, however, been held that he may retain the deposit if the tenancy
is terminated by abandonment and re-entry in the middle of the term.505
One might presume that a landlord with the bargaining power to do
so would jump at the chance to have the second or third formula de-
scribed above. Before he does, he ought to consider the federal in-
come tax implications. Sums paid to the landlord as advance rental,
or seemingly any sum the property in which passes to him at once, is
income in the year received.5 06 But a security deposit that does not
become his until the tenant's default is not income for tax purposes
until that event occurs. 507
For residential leases thereunder, the 1973 Residential Landlord-
Tenant Act brings important changes to the subject of security
deposits. If the tenant pays money "as a deposit or as security for
performance of the tenant's obligations," the leasing agreement must
spell out the conditions under which the landlord may retain any of it
and, specifically, must state if any of it is "a non-returnable cleaning
fee."5 08 The landlord must place such deposits in "a trust account in
a bank, savings and loan association, mutual savings bank, or licensed
escrow agent located in Wahington" and must give the tenant a
written receipt and written notice of the name and address of the de-
pository.509 In case the landlord ihtends to retain any portion of the
deposit, he must, within 14 days after termination of the tenancy,
"give a full and complete statement of the basis for retaining any of
the deposit together with the payment of any refund due." The
(written) notice must be delivered personally to the tenant or by mail
to his last known address. For failure to give the notice and any re-
505. Rockwell v. Eilers Music House, 67 Wash. 478, 122 P. 12 (1912).
506. Hyde Park Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1954);
Astor Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1943); Renwick v. United
States, 87 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1936).
507. Astor Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1943) (dictum);
Warren Service Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1940).
508. WASH. REv. CODE § 59.18.260 (Supp. 1973).
509. Id. § 59.18.270.
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fund due, the landlord is liable for the amount of refund due plus
costs and an attorney's fee.510 Because the statute says the landlord
must "give" the notice within 14 days and because of the general legal
principle that notice is effective only when received, it seems that it
must be delivered, not merely mailed, to the last known address within
that period.
The landlord is expressly forbidden by the Act to deduct anything
for ordinary wear and tear.511 Clearly these provisions were a re-
sponse to complaints that landlords were wrongfully retaining damage
and security deposits, which has probably been the most frequent
form of landlord-tenant dispute. Under the Act the landlord must con-
sider whether having a security deposit of the first or second type de-
scribed above is worth the trouble of following the statutory proce-
dures and the risk of losing costs and attorney's fees if they are not
scrupulously followed. Where the premises are unusually valuable and
the deposit correspondingly large, perhaps it will be worth it. With the
run-of-the-mill lease it may be surer and better for the landlord to
take, say, the last month's rent in advance or a modest, nonrefundable
cleaning deposit or both. An argument might be made that payment
of the last month's rent in advance falls within the statutory meaning
of "moneys . . . paid . . . as a deposit or as a security for per-
formance." This is an unnatural construction because advance rent
belongs absolutely to the landlord when received, is in no sense held
conditionally upon the tenant's performance, and thus is not held as
"security." The statutory requirement that the leasing agreement shall
specify the "terms and conditions" upon which the landlord could
withhold a "deposit" cannot be applied to advance rental. While ad-
vance rent does not perform the same function as a security deposit in
theory, in practice it can often be made to serve much the same pur-
pose.
2. Liquidated damages
Parties to a contract may agree that a specified sum will be liqui-
dated damages for certain breaches. In the several Washington deci-
sions concerning liquidated damages clauses in leases, the liquidated
510. Id. §§ 59.18.260& .280.
511. Id.§ 59.18.280.
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damages provision has always been connected to a security deposit.
That is to say, the tenant has paid the landlord a security deposit that
under the terms of the lease the landlord might retain as "liquidated
damages" in case of the tenant's default. Such clauses have been en-
forced in some jurisdictions, while in others they are labeled penalties
and denied enforcement. 512 The Washington position is that the liqui-
dated damages clause is enforceable and not a penalty, at least if the
sum held as liquidated damages bears a reasonable relation to the ac-
tual damages the landlord could suffer under the particular lease.513
Of course the liquidated damages provision has the advantage of
giving the landlord a sum certain which may be more than what the
tenant would otherwise be liable for by way of unpaid rent or other
damages.5 14 It cuts the other way, too. If the actual damages are more
than the liquidated damages, the landlord's recovery is limited to the
latter amount.515 It should be possible for the landlord to have it ei-
ther way if the lease, instead of making liquidated damages the auto-
matic remedy, gives him an election to have liquidated damages or in
the alternative to forego that remedy and pursue other remedies. 516
Nothing in the 1973 Landlord-Tenant Act seems to forbid liqui-
dated damages clauses as such. Of course if such a clause were con-
joined to a security deposit, then the security deposit would be regu-
lated by the Act, as outlined above.
H. Acceleration of Rent
Several circumstances may arise in which it would be convenient to
the landlord to have the legal right to recover rent for the unexpired
balance of the term. The most obvious such circumstance is where the
512. I A.L.P. § 3.73.
513. Barrett v. Monro, 69 Wash. 229, 124 P. 369 (1912); Smith v. Lambert Trans-
fer Co., 109 Wash. 529, 187 P. 362 (1920). See also Mon Wai v. Parks, 43 Wn. 2d
562, 26 P.2d 196 (1953); Benjamin Franklin Thrift Stores v. Jared, 192 Wash. 252,
73 P.2d 525 (1937); Pacific & Puget Sound Bottling Co. v. Clithero, 162 Wash. 156,
298 P. 316 (193 1).
514. Barrett v. Monro, 69 Wash. 229, 124 P. 369 (1912).
515. Mon Wai v. Parks, 43 Wn. 2d 562, 262 P.2d 196 (1953); Benjamin Franklin
Thrift Stores v. Jared, 192 Wash. 252, 73 P.2d 525 (1937); Pacific & Puget Sound
Bottling Co. v. Clithero, 162 Wash. 156, 298 P. 316 (1931).
516. Pague v. Petroleum Products, Inc., 77 Wn. 2d 219, 461 P.2d 317 (1969).
The lease said "lessor may" terminate and retain a deposit as liquidated damages. This,
the court held, allowed him to elect to affirm the lease and to sue for the balance due
on the rent.
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tenant vacates in mid-term and defaults in his rent. Bankruptcy, insol-
vency, or the tenant's cessation of business are other examples. Less
dramatic, but no doubt most common and therefore most important,
a threat to accelerate future rent gives a tenant who is inclined to fall
behind in paying his rent a powerful incentive to keep current.
Unless the lease gives him the power to accelerate rent, it is unlikely
that the landlord will achieve that result. It is problematical whether
the contracts doctrine of breach by anticipatory repudiation (fami-
liarly called anticipatory breach) will apply in the leasing context.
The single Washington decision that has been found on the subject
holds that the tenant's acts of vacating and ceasing to pay rent do not
"accelerate" future rental installments, by which the court meant there
was no anticipatory breach. 51 7 No other Washington case has been dis-
covered touching on any aspect of acceleration.
Authority from other jurisdictions generally upholds the enforcea-
bility of acceleration clauses in leases. A typical clause will give the
landlord a power to elect to accelerate future rental installments upon,
say, the tenant's default in rent, abandonment of the premises, ceasing
business on the premises, or bankruptcy. However, there is some
reason to avoid a clause conferring power to accelerate if the tenant
breaches "any" covenant.5 1 8 In the event of the tenant's being declared
bankrupt, the Federal Bankruptcy Act will limit the amount of future
rent that may be claimed, but there is nothing in that Act that prevents
using an acceleration clause.51 9
VII. INSURANCE AND TAXES
A. Insurance
No Washington decision has been found touching upon relations
between landlord and tenant with respect to insurance on the prem-
517. Myers v. Western Farmers Ass'n. 75 Wn. 2d 133. 449 P.2d 104 (1969).
5 18. Cases from the middle appellate courts in New York and California suggest
two arguments that an acceleration clause might be void as attempting to allow a
penalty. If acceleration is allowed for the tenant's breach of every minor promise, it
has been held that the amount of rent accelerated could be so disproportionate to
some slight breach as to amount to a penalty, making the clause void. 844 West End
Ave. Corp. v. Pearlman, 201 App. Div. 12. 193 N.Y.S. 670 (1922). The California
decision, Ricker v. Rombough, 120 Cal. App. 2d 912, 261 P.2d 328 (1953). held that
when the lease allowed the landlord both to accelerate rent and to retake possession
of the premises, this purported to allow him to have both rent and possession for the
same period, which amounted to a penalty. See generally I A.L.P. § 3.74: 43 CALIF.
L. REv. 344 (1955).
519. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(9) (1970): W. COLLIER. BANKRUPTCY §§ 63.32. 63.33
(14th ed. 1969).
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ises. American courts are agreed that neither party has an obligation
to insure except as required by the lease. If one or the other does in-
sure and a casualty loss occurs, he may retain the insurance proceeds
and need not apply them to restore the premises. So, if the parties in-
sert a clause in the lease requiring one of them. to insure, he should be
required to apply the proceeds to restoration. Of course if the damage
to the premises will allow the lease to be terminated, alternative pro-
vision must be made for disposition of the proceeds. Other provisions
should be included to regulate the kinds of coverage, amount, and
identity of the named insured.520
B. Taxes and Assessments
The small amount of Washington authority on leasehold taxes and
assessments is almost entirely on questions about the power of taxing
entities to tax leaseholds. We will speak briefly of these matters in a
moment, but our chief interest here is in rights and duties flowing
between landlord and tenant. There is a Washington opinion stating
that, in the absence of a lease provision to the contrary, the landlord
has the duty to pay real estate taxes. 521 It certainly is true that the
tenant has no such duty, and it does not seem precisely correct to say
the landlord has either, since it is doubtful that the tenant could force
him to pay taxes. However, as a practical matter the landlord had
better pay them, for a tax foreclosure sale would not only lose him his
reversion but would also cause a breach of his implied covenant to the
tenant for quiet enjoyment.
If the parties want to assign the duty to pay taxes or assessments to
the tenant, they must have him covenant to do so. Assuming the
tenant is to pay special assessments as well as taxes, the word "assess-
ments" should be specifically added, as decisions in other jurisdictions
have held that the word "taxes" does not include assessments. 522 Care
should be taken in stating when the tenant is to pay taxes or assess-
mients, i.e., whether when "due" or "before delinquency." Thought
should be given also to apportionment if commencement and termina-
tion of the tenancy does not coincide with the applicable taxing pe-
riod. When the parties contemplate the tenant's making improve-
520. See I A.L.P. § 3.75.
521. Coy v. Raabe, 69 Wn. 2d 346, 418 P.2d 728 (1966).
522. 1 A.L.P. § 3.76.
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ments, he should be required to pay any increase thereby caused in
real estate taxes, because permanent improvements will add to the real
property valuation unless the lease specifically provides that the im-
provements will remain the tenant's.52 3
The taxation of leaseholds is an incredibly complex matter in
Washington. One must first divide the subject into the taxing of lease-
holds in privately-owned lands and their taxing in publicly-owned
lands. Concerning the former, R.C.W. § 84.04.080 defines "personal
property" for tax purposes to include "all leases of real property and
leasehold interests therein for a term less than the life of the holder."
Prima facie this might seem to mean that leaseholds in both privately-
owned and publicly-owned lands would be subject to personal
property taxation. However, it was held in no uncertain terms in
Clark-Kunzl Co. v. Williams (1970)524 that leaseholds in privately-
owned land could not be separately taxed as personalty. Reviewing
the history of R.C.W. § 84.04.080, the court concluded it was in-
tended to describe only leaseholds in publicly-owned land. Therefore,
leaseholds in privately-owned lands may not be taxed separately; only
the reversion is taxed as real estate, and the assessor has no duty to
apportion taxes on it between landlord and tenant. 52 5
Taxation of leaseholds in public lands, a most convolute affair, has
recently undergone radical judicial and legislative changes and is
probably still in a state of flux. Because the subject was exhaustively
covered in a recent casenote in this Review, 526 only its outlines will
be sketched here. Leaseholds in public lands have long been taxed as
personalty, at least in theory. Due to a line of cases tracing back to the
1911 decision in Metropolitan Building Co. v. King County, 527 and
extending through the first appeal in Pier 67, Inc. v. King County52 8
in 1967, the Washington court held that such leaseholds were to be
valued for tax purposes by deducting from the market value of the
leasehold all rent due under the lease and the amount of any mortgage
indebtedness against the leasehold. Roughly speaking, this meant that
523. See Pier 67, Inc. v. King County. 71 Wn. 2d 92, 426 P.2d 610(1967).
524. 78 Wn. 2d 59, 469 P.2d 874 (1970) (unit assessment rule).
525. See Alaska Land Co. v. King County. 77 Wn. 2d 247, 461 P.2d 339 (1969).
526. See Note, State Taxation-Privately Held Leaseholds in Publicly Owned Land,
49 WASH. L. REv. 913 (1974).
527. 64 Wash. 615. 117 P. 495 (1911). Sequels to this case are Metropolitan Bldg.
Co. v. King County, 72 Wash. 47, 129 P. 883 (1913), and In re Metropolitan Bldg.
Co., 144 Wash. 469, 258 P. 473 (1927).
528. 71 Wn. 2d 92, 426 P.2d 610 (1967).
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the tax value was what is sometimes called the "bonus value" of the
leasehold, and since the agreed rent was apt to approximate market
value, in most cases taxation of leaseholds in public lands was
frustrated.
Then, in 1970 in the second appeal in Pier 67, Inc. v. King
County,529 the court suddenly reversed itself, overruling the earlier
line of cases. The second Pier 67 opinion held that leaseholds in
public lands should be valued for tax purposes at their fair market
value, without deductions for rent or for any mortgage debt. Presum-
ably this upset public landlords and their tenants, who had negotiated
their leases in view of the previous rule, and in 1973 the legislature
enacted a new law concerning the taxation of such leaseholds, now
R.C.W. § 84.36.450. Insofar as applicable here, that statute provides
that, as to leaseholds in public lands negotiated prior to July 1, 1970
and not renegotiated, extended, or renewed after that date, and that
provide for a contract rent at least 90 percent of "economic rent," the
leaseholds are exempt from taxation. However, as to such exempt
leaseholds, what is now R.C.W. § 82.29.030 provides that the
public-body landlord, except the United States Government, i.e., the
State of Washington and its subdivisions, shall pay an in-lieu excise
tax of 14 percent of the leasehold rent collected for the preceding
year. Of course, when the rent is less than 90 percent of economic
rent, the leasehold is taxable. Such are the current rules governing the
taxation of leaseholds in publicly-owned lands.
VIII. RENEWALS AND EXTENSIONS
A. Distinction Between Renewals and Extensions
We are here considering lease clauses giving the tenant an option to
renew or extend the tenancy. There is Washington authority for the
proposition that such an option must be contained in the leasing
agreement and will not be implied simply out of the fact that a tenant
holds over after his term with his landlord's consent. 530
Lexically, "renew" signifies a beginning over and repetition of a
thing, while "extend" means a continuation of the original thing. Var-
529. 78 Wn. 2d 48, 469 P.2d 902(1970).
530. Gehr v. Ferry County, 179 Wash. 68, 36 P.2d 71 (1934). But cf., Lynn v.
Waldron, 38 Wash. 82,80 P. 292 (1905).
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ious jurisdictions have taken three positions on the meanings of the
words "renewal" and "extension" as used in leases. One view is that
the words have their dictionary definitions, so that the "renewal" of a
lease requires the execution of a new leasing agreement. A second
view is that the court will look not merely to which of the two words
the parties chose, but will look to the totality of the circumstances to
decide which effect the parties intended. Decisions following this ap-
proach usually conclude that it would be unnatural to suppose the
parties meant renewal in the technical sense, since this would call for
them to execute a new agreement. The third view is to treat the words
"renew" and "extend" essentially as calling for an extension, so that
no new agreement is needed.53'
Washington clearly does not follow the first of the above views. The
choice between the second and third has not expressly been made,
though the cases seem consistent with the third view. There is lan-
guage, amounting at least to strong dictum, in two well-known opin-
ions that no distinction exists between renewals and extensions. 532 In
determining the length of term for purposes of statutes of frauds, we
add to the original term the period of "renewal," making one total
term. 533 Exercise of a renewal option may be made by giving notice,
without the necessity for executing a new lease. 534 In fact, if the lease
does not require a notice, the tenant may renew merely by remaining
in possession after the end of his term. 535 We can say at least that the
Washington court has identified no meaningful distinctions between
renewals and extensions in those situations in which such distinctions
would matter the most.
531. I A.L.P. § 3.85.
532. Labor Hall Ass'n v. Danielsen, 24 Wn. 2d 75. 163 P.2d 167 (1945): Henry
v. Bruhn & Henry, Inc., 110 Wash. 321, 188 P. 506(1920).
533. Labor Hall Ass'n v. Danielsen, 24 Wn. 2d 75. 163 P.2d 167 (1945): Ander-
son v. Frye & Bruhn, 69 Wash. 89, 124 P. 499 (1912). The Danielsen case is particu-
larly strong on the point in the text, for the lease did not merely say the tenant could
have a "renewal"; it said he could have "a new lease ...for the further term of one
(1) year .. " Nevertheless, the court said it was a single term.
534. Jones v. Dexter. 48 Wn. 2d 224, 292 P.2d 369 (1956) (dictum because
notice held inadequate); Gattavara v. Cascade Petroleum Co., 27 Wn. 2d 263, 177
P.2d 894 (1947) (alternative holding); Henry v. Bruhn & Henry, Inc.. 10 Wash. 321,
188 P. 506 (1920) (alternative holding).
535. Gattavara v. Cascade Petroleum Co.. 27 Wn. 2d 263. 177 P.2d 894 (1947)(alternative holding); Salzer v. Manfredi, 114 Wash. 666, 195 P. 1046 (1921): Henry
v. Bruhn & Henry, Inc., 110 Wash. 321, 188 P. 506 (1920) (alternative holding).
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B. Operation of RenewallExtension Provisions
As with any option, a tenant's renewal option must be for valuable
consideraton. In the usual situation, in which the lease itself contains
the option, this will be no problem, as the tenant's several covenants
will proyide consideration. But if the renewal option is contained in a
separate instrument, executed at a time apart from the lease, then the
option will fail where the tenant gives no fresh consideration.53 6 One
Washington decision holds, however, that new consideration is not
required when the separate instrument is executed on the same day as
the lease, as part of the same transaction. 53 7
We just referred to the principle that, for purposes of determining
the applicable statute of frauds, the periods of renewal options are
added to the period of the original term. Thus, a lease for a
one-year term would have to be acknowledged if it had a renewal op-
tion, though without the option it might be merely in writing.538 This
is the sort of thing the draftsman is liable to overlook unless he specifi-
cally puts it on his checklist.
Careful draftsmen will also give close attention to the provisions to
be incorporated into the renewal agreement. The basic problem here
springs from the general principle that, in an agreement to make an
agreement, the provisions of the final agreement must be spelled out in
sufficient detail that the parties' intent may be determined. We must
hasten to note that the Supreme Court of Washington has applied this
principle in a very relaxed fashion to renewal clauses. Of course a
renewal option that leaves all terms "to be agreed upon" at the time of
exercise is too vague to be enforced.539 Presumably, a sure formula
would be to state that the provisions on renewal will be the same as in
the original lease, except that the renewal clause itself shall be deleted.
The parties, though, may wish to adjust some features of the original
lease, most often the amount of rent. A provision that the rent on re-
newal will be determined by agreement or, if that fails, by arbitration
has been upheld.540 So have much vaguer formulas for rent. The
536. Hill v. Corbett, 33 Wn. 2d 219, 204 P.2d 845 (1949).
537. Spotts v. Westlake Garage Co., 116 Wash. 255, 199 P. 294 (192 1).
538. See especially Labor Hall Ass'n v. Danielsen, 24 Wn. 2d 75, 163 P.2d 167
(1945).
539. Finch v. King Solomon Lodge No. 60, 40 Wn. 2d 440, 243 P.2d 645 (1952).
540. Faucett v. Northern Clay Co., 84 Wash. 382, 146 P. 857 (1915).
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phrases "reasonable rent," "rental acceptable to the lessors," "such
rental as may then be agreed upon," and "subject to the consent of the
lessors" have all been held to call for a reasonable rent, to be fixed by
the trial court. 541 In a somewhat similar vein, a renewal for "such pe-
riod as may then be agreed upon" has been enforced as calling for at
least a repetition of the original term. 542 Interpretations of the
meaning of "reasonable" and of renewal clauses in general have
tended clearly to favor the tenant. 543
Even though the renewal clause is adequately drawn, subsequent
events may bring in question whether the tenant may attain its bene-
fits. The 1920 decision in Henry v. Bruhn & Henry, Inc. 544 contains a
holding that the tenant could not exercise his renewal option because
he was in default in his rent and had breached another covenant.
However, the next year the Washington court reached a precisely
opposite result in the second appeal of the same case. 545 The court
denied that the earlier decision held to the contrary, but it did. Pre-
sumably the later decision controls, and its result seems founded in the
traditional leasing concept that the covenants of a lease are indepen-
dent. To say that the tenant may not exercise his option if he is in
breach, as the court did in its first decision, implies the dependency of
the covenants, which is contract law reasoning, rather than the con-
veyancing law reasoning of independency. Of course the courts, in
Washington and elsewhere, have been increasingly applying contract
reasoning to leases, a phenomenon that might allow the dependency-
independency issue to be re-examined one of these days.
The tenant must give thought to the manner in which he exercises
his renewal option. If the option clause requires him to give the land-
lord notice of his election to exercise it, he must specifically do S0. 546
541. Murray v. Odman, I Wn. 2d 481. 96 P.2d 489 (1939) ("reasonable"):
Diettrich v. J. J. Newberry Co., 172 Wash. 18. 19 P.2d 115 (1933) ("acceptable to
lessors"): Young v. Nelson, 121 Wash. 285. 209 P. 515 (1922) ("as may then be
agreed upon"): Blume v. Bohanna. 38 Wn. 2d 199, 228 P.2d 146 (1951) ("consent of
the lessor").
542. Faucett v. Northern Clay Co., 84 Wash. 382. 146 P. 857(1915).
543. See Murray v. Odman, I Wn. 2d 481. 96 P.2d 489 (1939): Spotts v. West-
lake Garage Co., 116 Wash. 255, 199 P. 294 (1921): Faucett v. Northern Clay Co..
84 Wash. 382, 146 P. 857(1915).
544. l10Wash. 321, 188 P. 506(1920).
545. Henry v. Bruhn & Henry, Inc.. 114 Wash. 180. 195 P. 20 (1921). Cf. Keene
v. Zindorf, 81 Wash. 152, 142 P. 484 (1914).
546. Jones v. Dexter. 48 Wn. 2d 224, 292 P.2d 369 (1956). holds it was not ade-
quate notice for the tenant to advise the landlord he would later "talk to you about
renewing the lease."
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However, according to repeated Washington decisions, if the lease
does not specify how the tenant is to exercise the option, he may do so
merely by staying in possession after the end of his original term.547
Several miscellaneous questions have arisen concerning the exercise
of renewal options. The tenant may exercise his option though his
landlord has died, thus requiring the latter's a dministrator to make the
new lease.5 48 Apparently the optionee tenant is not prevented from
renewing by the fact that he has assigned his lease as security for a
debt, even though. renewal would work to the disadvantage of his as-.
signee. 549 Where the subtenant has a power to renew and the head
tenant has a similar power in the head lease, the subtenancy will be
cut off if the principal landlord and tenant do not renew, and the sub-
tenant has no complaint if they fail to do so.550
C. Perpetual Renewals
But one Washington decision has been found touching upon a
question of the effect of a perpetual renewal clause.551 The case in-
volved a clause giving the tenant "the privilege at the same rate and
terms each year thereafter from year to year." Invoking the principle
that perpetual renewals are disfavored, the court held no perpetual
renewal option existed. This principle is generally recognized else-
where, the courts sometimes interpreting a general covenant for re-
newal as giving only one renewal period. If the perpetual renewal lan-
guage is inescapably clear, other jurisdictions have held that the per-
petual renewal is valid and amounts to the grant of a fee.552 There is a
sophisticated argument that can be made against this result, but it is
not known if it has ever been raised.553
547. Gattavara v. Cascade Petroleum Co., 27 Wn. 2d 263, 177 P.2d 894 (1947)
(apparent holding); Salzer v. Manfredi, 114 Wash. 666, 195 P. 1046 (1921); Henry
v. Bruhn & Henry, Inc., 110 Wash. 321, 188 P. 506 (1920) (alternative holding).
548. In re Mundts' Estates, 169 Wash. 593, 14 P.2d 59 (1932).
549. See First Nat'l Bank v. Farm Loan & Inv. Co., 140 Wash. 410, 249 P. 983
(1926).
550. See McDuffie v. Noonan, 176 Wash. 436, 29 P.2d 634 (1934); Greene v.
Garrison, 107 Wash. 430, 181 P. 858 (1919).
551. Tischner v. Rutledge, 35 Wash. 285, 77 P. 388 (1904).
552. 1 A.L.P. § 3.87.
553. The argument would run like this: If'the tenant has a fee but must per-
petually pay rent for it, he holds essentially in what was in feudal English law a kind
of socage tenure. His landlord perpetually retains the right to the rent, and the con-
veyance amounts to a subinfeudation of the tenant. Subinfeudation was thereafter
prohibited by the Statute Quia Emptores of 1290, 18 Edw. I, St. I, c. 1. Quia
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IX. PURCHASE OPTIONS
A. Nature and Creation of Purchase Options
Leases sometimes confer upon the tenant an option to purchase the
demised premises. Two forms of option are in use, the straight option
to purchase and the so-called "right" (power) of first refusal. A
straight option operates like purchase options that are commonly
given separate from leases. The tenant may exercise the option during
the life of the leasehold or during some other stated period by giving
notice of his election to do so. Obviously, the purchase price and
terms of purchase should be spelled out with sufficient particularity to
avoid any question of vagueness. Little Washington authority exists
on how precisely the terms must be set forth, and it is not known if the
Washington court would allow terms as vague here as they do with
tenants' renewal options. 554 It apparently is permissible to have the
purchase price to be fixed by arbitration or appraisal. 555 While the
opinion clause ought to state specifically the time period within which
the tenant may exercise the option, if no period is stated, he may exer-
cise it anytime during the term of the lease. 55 6
The right of first refusal may also be classified as an option, but its
exercise depends upon conditions. Typically the tenant is given the
election to purchase the premises if the landlord is disposed to accept
a purchase offer from a third person, generally on the same terms as
the third person offers.5 57 In the event the landlord receives an offer,
before he may accept it, he is required to allow the tenant a stated pe-
riod, such as 30 days, to purchase. Although the law does not prefer a
straight option to a right of first refusal, the result in one Washington
decision suggests that the draftsman who desires the latter device
should be at pains to make that clear. Roth v. Snider5 58 held that the
Emptores, being an ancient and fundamental statute, is a part of the common law of
the United States, except in Maryland and possibly two or three other original states.
Ergo, a fee upon perpetual rent, being essentially a subinfeudation, is prohibited. One
presumes that all lawyers are familiar with feudal estates in land and with Quia
Emptores, but for nonlawyers who may wish to brush up a bit on the subject.
T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW. 531-45 (5th ed. 1956),
may provide a start.
554. See discussion in Section VIII-B supra.
555. See Omicron Co. v. Hansen, 16 Wn. 2d 362, 133 P.2d 505 (1943).
556. Willenbrock v. Latulippe, 125 Wash. 168, 215 P. 330 (1923).
557. See Superior Portland Cement, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Cement Co., 33 Wn. 2d
169, 205 P.2d 597 (1949). which covers many of the aspects of rights of first refusal.
558. 25Wn. 2d 514, 171 P.2d 819 (1946).
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following language created a straight option: "The farm is subject to
sale. The tenant has first option to purchase farm for [stated price and
terms] ."
Options, of either of the kinds described, must of course be sup-
ported by consideration. When the option is "included in a lease, the
tenant's various covenants will provide sufficient consideration. 559 In
Washington, since options and contracts for the sale of land must be
written and signed, leases containing a purchase option must be in the
same form, but they need not be acknowledged. 560 It would seem a
good idea to have them acknowledged, simply so they may be re-
corded and thus unequivocably give notice of the option to third per-
sons who might acquire an interest in the land.561 A lease containing a
purchase option is subject to the one-percent tax on sales of realty, the
same as a contract of sale. 56 2 This does not mean options would be
treated as contracts for other purposes, for apparently they would not
be.-563
A significant question undecided in Washington is whether the Rule
Against Perpetuities applies to a purchase option contained in a lease.
Purchase options standing in separate documents are void if, by their
terms, they could be exercised beyond the period of the Rule. Thus, it
might be argued that a purchase option exercisable during the entire
term of, say, a 25-year lease would be void. American courts, how-
ever, have refused to apply the Rule to leasehold options.564
B. Operation and Exercise of Purchase Options
For some purposes it seems safe, indeed prudent, to assume that a
purchase option in a lease is treated the same as if it were in a sepa-
rate document. This seems to be so for purposes of the statute of
frauds, as mentioned above. It is possible to have an option exercis-
able after the end of the lease term if the option is given for a period
that extends beyond the term.565 As we shall see, it is quite possible in
559. Richardson v. Harkness, 59 Wash. 474, 110 P. 9 (1910).
560. Phillipp v. Curtis, 35 Wn. 2d 844, 215 P.2d 431 (1950).
561. See Strong v. Clark, 56 Wn. 2d 230, 352 P.2d 183 (1960).
562. WASH. REv. CODE § 28A.45.010 (1963).
563. See Bank of California v. Clear Lake Lumber Co., 146 Wash. 543, 264
P. 705 (1928), which holds that a bailment for hire with a purchase option is not a
conditional contract of sale.
564. 1 A.L.P. § 3.83.
565. Union Oil Co. v. Hale, 163 Wash. 503, 2 P.2d 87 (193 1).
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Washington for a tenant to exercise his purchase option in mid-term,
yet not terminate the leasehold. 566 In these ways the option is more or
less severed from the leasehold and from the other provisions of the
lease. Yet, there is a cross-current and a certain inconsistency in
Washington on this matter, because it has been held that the tenant
may not assign his purchase option to any greater extent than the
leasehold itself if the lease contains a nonassignment clause.567 More-
over, if Washington should follow the general view that the Rule
Against Perpetuities does not apply to lease options, that would also
suggest the option was an integral part of the lease. The point is, then,
that one ought not depend or base decisions upon an abstract prin-
ciple that the option either will or will not be treated as an integral
part of the lease.
In what form must the tenant signify his election to exercise a pur-
chase option? Of course the lease itself may answer this question, as
where it requires the notice to be "written." In the absence of such a
requirement, Washington allows the notice to be oral as well as writ-
ten.5 6
8
A number of questions have been presented about the time when a
purchase option may effectively be exercised. Ultimately these ques-
tions are referable back to the language of the option; the tenant
cannot exercise his power beyond the agreed time, of course. 569 If the
option clearly is exercisable up to a fixed calendar date, then it has
been held the tenant may exercise it up to that time even if the lease
term has previously ended. 570 When the lease does not place express
time limits on exercising the option, it will be exercisable anytime
during the term of the lease.5 71 In the case of a periodic tenancy, this
means the option continues as long as the tenancy continues, period to
period.572 It also means the option is lost if the leasehold terminates
early, as by the tenant's abandonment.57 3 By a similar token, a pur-
chase option that is exercisable during the term of the lease continues
566. White v. Coates, 17 Wn. 2d 686, 137 P.2d 113 (1943).
567. Behrens v. Cloudy, 50 Wash. 400, 97 P. 450 (1908).
568. Duprey v. Donahoe, 52 Wn. 2d 129, 323 P.2d 903 (1958).
569. See Gray v. Lipscomb, 48 Wn. 2d 624, 296 P.2d 308 (1956).
570. Union Oil Co. v. Hale, 163 Wash. 503, 2 P.2d 87 (1931). The lease ended
because the tenant failed to exercise a renewal option.
571. Phillipp v. Curtis, 35 Wn. 2d 844, 215 P.2d 431 (1950): Sandberg v. Light,
55 Wash. 189, 104 P. 205 (1909).
572. Phillipp v. Curtis, 35 Wn. 2d 844, 215 P.2d 431 (1950).
573. Sandberg v. Light, 55 Wash. 189, 104 P. 205 (1909).
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to be exercisable within periods of extensions of the term.574 When the
tenant has a right of first refusal exercisable within 30 days after the
landlord gives him notice of another offer, he has the full 30 days
even if they would run beyond the end of the term. In fact, if the land-
lord has, during the tenancy, made a contract to sell to another and the
tenant does not learn of this until after the term, Washington has held
the tenant may then exercise the option.575
Purchase options, not necessarily purchase options in leases, but
purchase options in general, are for some purposes said to relate, back
to the date of the option when exercised. Crowley v. Byrne,57 6 a 1912
opinion involving a purchase option not contained in a lease, held
that upon exercise the optionee's title related back to the date the op-
tion was given, so as to cut off the claim of a third person who, with
notice of the recorded option, acquired an interest in the land between
the date the option was given and the date it was exercised. However,
a lease case, Hardinger v. Blackmon,577 refused to apply the relation-
back principle when a landlord claimed his option-exercising
tenant owed interest on the purchase price back to the date the option
was created. Crowley was cited without criticism but found inapplic-
able for reasons that are not clear. One suspects the relation-back doc-
trine would be applied in the leasing context on facts like those in
Crowley. It would be hazardous to predict just when the Washington
court would or would not relate back the exercise of leasehold op-
tions, though we might guess it would do so when the tenant would be
benefitted.
Most jurisdictions have held that the tenant's exercise of his pur-
chase option during his term ends the landlord-tenant relation and
begins a vendor-purchaser relation. Thereby, duties under the lease,
574. Superior Portland Cement, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Cement Co., 33 Wn. 2d 169,
205 P.2d 597 (1949). The option was a right of first refusal rather than a straight
purchase option, but that should make no difference for the purpose for which the
case was cited.
575. Superior Portland Cement, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Cement Co., 33 Wn. 2d 169,
205 P.2d 597 (1949). The prior decision in Signal Oil Co. v. Republic Inv. Co., II
Wn. 2d 325, 118 P.2d 957 (1941), appears to be seriously to the contrary. There the
tenant had a right of first refusal, exercisable within 30 days after notice. The land-
lord made a contract during the lease term to sell the land to a third person, who
was to take possession after the end of the term. The tenant attempted to exercise his
option within 30 days after this contract was made, but the court held his option did
not apply when the sale would not operate to disturb his possession during.the term,
576. 71Wash. 444, 129 P. 113 (1912).
577. 13 Wn. 2d 94, 124 P.2d 220 (1942).
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including the duty to pay rent, cease. 578 However, in Washington the
quite remarkable decision in White v. Coates57 9 puts these principles
in considerable doubt. The tenant exercised a purchase option and
tendered the full price in the middle of a one year leasehold of or-
chard lands. Nevertheless, he was held liable for the balance of the
rent, one-third of the year's orchard crop. The court laid down the
rule that the leasehold and the duty to pay rent may continue after
exercise of the option if the parties intend it. There was also dictum in
White that a lease may terminate if the parties so intend. On the facts
of the case, the court found an intent that the leasehold and rent con-
tinue. Possibly it was the form of the rent that moved the court to this
conclusion, possibly other factors. Because of the unclear dimensions
of the decision, the Washington draftsman should state expressly
whether exercise of a purchase option will terminate the tenancy and
what effect it will have on obligations under the lease.
Not much question has arisen in Washington about how to fix the
option purchase price. With the right of first refusal, the situation
normally should take care of itself, as the tenant will be required to
meet the third party's offer. We previously noted that, with the
straight option, a fixed price should be named or be left to appraisal
or arbitration. No decisions have been found on the sufficiency of
phrases like "price to be agreed upon" or "reasonable price"; it is
hoped that the careful draftsman would avoid such loose phrases any-
how. There are a pair of decisions on arbitrated prices; one holds that
a court may fix a reasonable price if the arbitrators cannot agree;580
and the other holds that the tenant must give notice of exercise before,
not after, arbitration. 581
X. TRANSFERS OF INTEREST BY LANDLORD OR
TENANT
Because the landlord and tenant each has an estate in land, a rever-
sion and a leasehold, respectively, each has an interest that is capable
of being transferred to some third person. Here we will consider the
nature of such transfers, how they may be made, marks of distinction
578. 1 A.L.P. § 3.84.
579. 17Wn. 2d 686, 137 P.2d 113(1943).
580. Richardson v. Harkness, 59 Wash. 474, 110 P. 9 (1910).
581. Omicron Co. v. Hansen, 16Wn. 2d 362, 133 P.2d 505 (1943).
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among them, restrictions upon their making, and consequences of
their being made.
A. Transfers by Tenant
1. Tenant's transfers in general
Of tenants' transfers there are two sorts: the assignment and the
sublease. At this point we will simply say that in general an assign-
ment is of the full balance of the tenant's term, while a sublease is a
transfer of the right of possession for a period less than the full bal-
ance. Finer distinctions will be left to the next subsection.
In Washington a tenant usually may freely assign, or presumably
also sublet, as long as no covenant in his lease restricts him. 582 Some
states have statutes requiring the landlord's consent to transfers,5 83 but
there is no such statute in Washington. There may, however, be one
type of lease in which a covenant not to assign without the landlord's
consent is implied. In general, this would be where the tenant pays
rent as crop shares or a percentage of sales, so that the landlord is
dependent upon the skills of this particular tenant. Lloyd v. Woods584
contains what seems an alternative holding that a farm lease on crop
rents was impliedly not assignable without consent. Other jurisdictions
have decided that leases calling for rent payable as a percentage of the
tenant's sales are unassignable without consent.585 No Washington
case on this latter point has been found, though Lloyd leans that way
in theory.
The essence of an assignment or sublease is that the tenant mani-
fests his intent to transfer to another his tenancy in all or part of the
premises for all or part of the balance of his term. Except for the
statute of frauds problem, to be discussed in a moment, no particular
form of transfer is required. For instance, he may assign informally by
allowing another to assume possession of the premises for the balance
of his term.586 The tenant cannot assign to himself or to a corporation
582. Cupples v. Level, 54 Wash. 299, 103 P. 430 (1909) (assignment).
583. 1 A.L.P. § 3.56.
584. 165Wash. 541,5P.2d 1000(1931).
585. 1 A.L.P. § 3.56.
586. Worthington v. Moreland Motor Truck Co., 140 Wash. 528, 250 P. 30 (1926).
The landlord joined the tenant in consenting to the assignment, but this seems of no
moment.
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that is merely his alter ego, although there is Washington dictum that
he might assign to a worthless corporation or person. 587 However, the
assignee must be a person legally capable of holding a leasehold and,
according to one decision, must consent to the transfer.5 88
Several times the Supreme Court of Washington has been called
upon to decide if certain transactions amounted to transfers of the
leasehold. If the arrangement is only one in which the third party uses
the land to assist the tenant in carrying out his business, no assignment
or sublease occurs. Thus there is no transfer when the third person
works land on crop shares, pastures his cattle there, or manages and
operates the tenant's business.5 89 But if what appears in form to be
some other arrangement actually amounts to a transfer of legal posses-
sion, then the court has looked through form to find that an assign-
ment has occurred. Examples are arrangements that superficially ap-
peared as management contracts or powers of attorney. 590
Washington has an unsettled situation and a serious split in the
cases on the question whether an assignment must meet the statute of
frauds. Two older cases contain flat, deliberate holdings that an as-
signment need not be acknowledged, even if the leasehold has several
years left to run. ' !): Other opinions contain strong dictum to the same
effect. 59 2 None of these decisions appears formally to have been over-
ruled. But two considerably later decisions, Geyen v. Time Oil Co. 593
and Mobley v. Harkins,594 imply very strongly, if they do not hold,
that an assignment must be acknowledged if the lease was for over a
year and had to be acknowledged. In both cases, however, the unac-
knowledged assignments were taken out of the statute of frauds by acts
587. National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472. 78 P.2d 535 (1938).
See alsoTibbals v. Iffland, 10 Wash. 451, 39 P. 102 (1894).
588. Frye v. Hill. 14 Wash. 83. 43 P. 1097 (1896) (attempted assignment to non-
consenting alien void).
589. Lindley v. de la Pole, 131 Wash. 657, 230 P. 851 (1924) (crop shares):
Golden v. Mount, 32 Wn. 2d 653, 203 P.2d 667 (1949) (pasturing cattle); Chopot v.
Foster. 51 Wn. 2d 406, 3 18 P.2d 976 (1957) (operating business; alternative holding).
590. Bedgisoff v. Morgan, 23 Wn. 2d 737. 162 P.2d 238 (1945) (management
contract): Guill v. Enomoto. 117 Wash. 575, 201 P. 910 (1921) (power of attorney).
See also Threlkeld v. Conway. 121 Wash. 624. 209 P. 1088 (1922) (assignment
containing defeasance clause is assignment, not mortgage).
591. Cravens v. Cravens, 136 Wash. 126, 238 P. 901 (1925): American Say.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Mafridge, 60 Wash. 180, 110 P. 1015 (1910).
592. Myers v. Arthur. 135 Wash. 583, 238 P. 899 (1925) (dictum): Tibbals v.
Iffland, 10 Wash. 451, 39 P. 102(1894) (the dictum that started it all).
593. 46 Wn. 2d 457, 282 P.2d 287 (1955).
594. 14Wn. 2d 276. 128 P.2d 289 (1942).
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of the assignees. Other jurisdictions generally require an assignment to
be in writing if the balance of the term is long enough so that a lease
of that length would have to be written.5 95 And then one must con-
sider the effect of R.C.W. §§ 65.08.060 & .070, which require, as
against third persons, that the assigriment of every "lease for a term"
over two years shall be recorded, which implies acknowledgment. 596
It is not clear whether "term" of the lease refers to its original or re-
maining term, though caution indicates the former should be assumed.
Of course, since recording statutes affect only the rights of third per-
sons, the statute does not directly control the form of assignment be-
tween landlord and tenant. However, that does not change the prac-
tical result; the assignment ought to be acknowledged and recorded.
Putting together all the foregoing discussion, it seems the careful
draftsman will employ a written assignment if the original lease had to
be written, an acknowledged assignment if the lease had to be ac-
knowledged, and that he will do so regardless of how long the term
has yet to run. Otherwise, an assignment may be oral.
No authority has been found on the required form of a sublease.
Because the sublease is actually a new lease between the head tenant
and his subtenant, it would seem initially that it would have to be exe-
cuted with the same formality, written or acknowledged, as would a
principal, lease for the same term. It might be argued that, because the
sublease is created out of the head lease, the latter being a chattel real
and not realty, the real property statutes of frauds do not apply. With
the question untested, the draftsman again should do the cautious
thing and execute the sublease with all the formalities required for a
principal lease of the same term.
2. Assignment and sublease distinguished
Both an assignment and a sublease are transfers by the tenant of
estates in the demised land, i.e., transfers of possession in the full legal
sense for a period of time. It will not be enough that the tenant trans-
fers some interest other than possession. One Washington decision
goes so far as to say there is no assignment when the tenant grants a
595. 1 A.L.P. § 3.56.
596. Tibbals v. Iffland, 10 Wash. 451, 39 P. 102 (1894), held no recording was
required, but it was decided prior to the statute.
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third person the right to possess jointly with himself for the balance of
his term.597 The foundation of this opinion may be a bit shaky, since
it seems possible to have joint tenants in a leasehold estate as well as
in a fee. Nevertheless, the decision emphasizes that assignments (and
subleases) consist of transfers of possessory estates.
The essence of an assignment is that the tenant transfers the entire
balance of his leasehold estate. In several cases the Washington court
has said and held, correctly, that a transfer purporting to be a "sub-
lease" is actually an assignment if it passes the balance of the term. 598
Some related questions that have created confusion elsewhere seem to
have been also correctly decided in Washington. Suppose the tenant
transfers the balance of his term but reserves a power of forfeiture,
i.e., a right of entry, if the transferee fails to pay rent or otherwise
breaches. Does the reservation amount to a reversion in the transferor
tenant, because he has not transferred his entire interest? No, says the
Washington court; there is no retention of a reversion, and the full
term is assigned.59 :1 Similarly, the transferor's charging a premium to
the assignee, above the amount of rent to be paid the landlord, does
not convert an assignment into a sublease. 600 What if the tenant trans-
fers the entire balance of his term, but only in a portion of the prem-
ises? Some courts have mistakenly labeled this a sublease, but the cor-
rect analysis, and the analysis stated in dictum in one Washington
opinion, is that it is a partial assignment. 601
By contrast with an assignment, a sublease is the tenant's transfer to
another of a possessory estate for a time shorter than the balance of
the tenant's term. Thus, within the term of his own leasehold estate,
the original, or head, tenant retains a reversion. This reversion need
be of no particular length; one day will suffice. So, the chronological
order of estates in the land is: possessory leasehold estate in the sub-
tenant, leasehold reversion in the head tenant, and reversion in fee in
597. Barnes v. Standard Oil Co., 167 Wash. 609, 9 P.2d 1095 (1932).
598. Gazzam v. Young, 114 Wash. 66, 194 P. 810 (1921): Sheridan v. 0. E.
Doherty, Inc., 106 Wash. 561, 181 P. 16 (1919); Weander v. Claussen Brewing Co..
42 Wash. 226, 84 P. 735 (1906), McLennan v. Grant, 8 Wash. 603, 36 P. 682 (1894).
599. Sheridan v. 0. E. Doherty. Inc., 106 Wash. 561, 181 P. 16 (1919) (alterna-
tive holding); Weander v. Claussen Brewing Co., 42 Wash. 226. 84 P. 735 (1906).
600. American Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Mafridge, 60 Wash. 180. 110 P. 1015
(1910).
601. Hockersmith v. Sullivan, 71 Wash. 244, 128 P. 222 (1912) (dictum: "'assign-
ment pro tanto"). See also Barnes v. Standard Oil Co.. 167 Wash. 609. 616. 9 P.2d
1095 (1932), where the notion of partial assignment is recognized in passing.
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the head landlord. Between themselves, the head tenant and the sub-
tenant stand in a true landlord-tenant relationship. This is shown, for
instance, by the fact that the head tenant may bring an unlawful de-
tainer action against his subtenant.6 02 No legal relationship is created
between the head landlord and the subtenant by the subleasing, al-
though the landlord may look to the head tenant if the subtenant does
some act on the land that contravenes the head lease.603
3. Tenant's covenants against transfer
Language in some way restricting the tenant's otherwise existing
power to assign or sublet is boilerplate in many leases. Occasionally
the tenant will covenant not to assign or sublet at all. While such cov-
enants are a direct restraint on alienation, they generally have been
upheld in other jurisdictions, 60 4 but Washington seems to have no case
on that exact point. More commonly than absolute restraints, leases
will contain a covenant not to assign or to sublet without the land-
lord's prior consent. The parties may add that the landlord shall not
unreasonably withhold consent or that he will not withhold consent if
an assignee or subtenant with certain qualifications is produced. All
the Washington cases reported here are ones in which assignment or
subletting was forbidden only if without consent.
Though covenants restricting tenants' transfers may be valid, they
still are strictly construed, because they do somewhat offend the
policy against restraints on alienation. On this ground, it has been
held in Washington that a covenant not to "assign" does not restrict
subletting,605 and a covenant prohibiting a "sublease" does not inhibit
assignment. 606 Covenants against subletting the "whole of the premis-
es," or words to that effect, do not prevent subletting a part of
them.607 The question also may be raised whether a covenant against
assignment will extend so as to prevent the tenant's assigning a part of
his rights in the lease, separating them from the leasehold itself. It
602. Stahl Brewing & Malting Co. v. Van Buren, 45 Wash. 451, 88 P. 837 (1907).
603. Shepard v. Dye, 137 Wash. 180, 242 P. 381 (1926).
604. 1 A.L.P. § 3.58.
605. Burns v. Dufresne, 67 Wash. 158, 121 P. 46(1912).
606. Willenbrock v. Latulippe, 125 Wash. 168, 215 P. 330 (1923).
607. Cuschner v. Westlake, 43 Wash. 690, 86 P. 948 (1906) (alternative ground);
Spencer v. Commercial Co., 30 Wash. 520, 71 P. 53 (1902). In Spencer there was an
additional fact: the tenant was already subletting the premises when the lease began.
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may be tentatively advanced that no part of the rights may be as-
signed, based upon a decision that a covenant against assignment pro-
hibited the tenant's separately assigning a purchase option his lease
contained. 60 8 Enough has been said to suggest that the landlord's
draftsman has the laboring oar, to spell out, if it is his intent, that the
tenant is restricted both in assigning and subletting, as to all parts of
the premises, and as to all rights under the lease.
As previously mentioned, where assignment or subletting is re-
stricted, the qualification is usually added, "except with the landlord's
prior [written] consent." With such language, it seems decided in
Washington that the landlord may give or withhold consent arbitrar-
ily, without offering a reason. 609 Sometimes, however, there is further
language, such as "consent shall not be unreasonably withheld" or
"landlord shall consent" if the assignee meets certain standards. Hedge-
cock v. Mendel6 10 holds that a phrase such as "landlord shall con-
sent" is a covenant by him that is specifically enforceable by the
tenant. Dictum in Hedgecock says that the formulation, "consent shall
not be unreasonably withheld," is not a covenant by the landlord but,
rather, a condition to the tenant's covenant not to assign, so that the
landlord's unreasonable refusal releases the tenant to assign but gives
him nothing to enforce against the landlord. If the force of the distinc-
tion seems dubious to the draftsman, Hedgecock will still suggest he
should think about the difference between the two phraseologies and
perhaps spell out his intention.
What is the effect if the tenant goes through the motion of making
an assignment forbidden by his lease? The accepted rule is that there
is nevertheless an assignment of the leasehold and of such duties and
rights under the lease as will run to an assignee.6 1 1 He specifically
acquires the duty to pay rent to the landlord.6 12 If he does pay the
608. Behrens v. Cloudy, 50 Wash. 400, 97 P. 450 (1908). But cf. Oregon-Wash-
ington R.R. & Nay. Co. v. Eastern Oregon Banking Co., 81 Wash. 617. 143 P. 154
(1914), which holds that a covenant against assignment did not prevent the tenant
from assigning to another the right to remove his improvements at the end of the
term, a right the lease guaranteed him.
609. Coulos v. Desimone, 34 Wn. 2d 87, 208 P.2d 105 (1949). See also Alwen v.
Tramontin, 131 Wash. 78, 228 P. 851 (1924), which holds a landlord may, for giving
consent, extract a fee, even if the lease says a smaller payment "shall be made" by the
tenant.
610. 146 Wash. 404, 263 P. 593 (1928).
611. Morrison v. Nelson, 38 Wn. 2d 649, 231 P.2d 335 (1951); National Bank of
Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P.2d 535 (1938).
612. National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P.2d 535 (1938).
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rent and the landlord accepts it, knowing of the assignment, then the
landlord has no legal remedy on account of the prohibited assign-
ment.613 It is not clear from the cases just cited whether this is on a
theory of estoppel, waiver, or implied consent. Where the landlord is
not estopped and has not consented or waived, it seems, from deci-
sions outside Washington, that the landlord still may not undo the
wrongful assignment as such, but he has a damages action against the
original tenant for breach of the covenant.614 Frequently the lease will
contain a landlord's forfeiture clause, either one conjoined to the non-
assignment clause or a general clause allowing him to forfeit (termi-
nate) for any breach by the tenant. With either kind of forfeiture
clause, the Washington landlord may terminate the lease because of
the tenant's wrongful assignment, assuming, of course, the landlord
has not accepted the assignee.615 It follows that, from the landlord's
point of view, a clause restricting assignment is much more useful if
the lease has a forfeiture clause than if it does not.
A question much mooted about is whether, when the landlord's
consent to assignment is required and he gives consent to one assign-
ment, further assignments by the assignees may be made without con-
sent. The venerable rule in Dumpor's Case616 is that one consent de-
stroys the condition, so that consent is not thereafter required. Amer-
ican reception of the rule is checkered. Most cases on the issue,
though criticizing Dumpor's Case, say they follow its rule, but in fact
these cases have created various exceptions to it.617 In Washington the
force of the Dumpor's rule is not settled, although it was repudiated in
strong dictum in Puget Mill Co. v. Kerry. 618 As the court phrased it,
in somewhat uncharacteristic terms, the covenant restricting assign-
ment should "run with the land" (the leasehold estate), so as to bind
assignees. There is a Washington decision on a fact pattern opposite
that in Dumpor's, that is, several assignments were made without the
613. Field v. Copping, Agnew & Scales, 65 Wash. 359, 118 P. 329 (1911); Batley
v. Dewalt, 56 Wash. 431, 105 P. 1029 (1909).
614. 1 A.L.P. § 3.58.
615. Boyd v. North, 114 Wash. 540, 195 P. 1011 (1921). See also Chopot v.
Foster, 51 Wn. 2d 406, 318 P.2d 976 (1957), which contains an alternative holding
that, without a forfeiture clause, the landlord may not elect to terminate because of
the tenant's wrongful assignment.
616. 4Coke 119b, 76Eng. Rep. l110(K.B. 1603).
617. See I A.L.P. § 3.58.
618. 183 Wash. 542,49 P.2d 57 (1935).
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required landlord's consent, then a final assignment was made with his
consent. The final assignment was held valid.6 19
B. Transfers by Landlord
The landlord may convey his reversion in the demised premises,
usually by a deed granting the fee. Washington seems to have no au-
thority dealing with special formalities of such a conveyance or with
the overall impact upon the tenant or his leasehold. We will, in
Subsection X-C-3 infra, consider some specific effects of the land-
lord's conveyance and will see that the grantee acquires the right to
the tenant's rent. To some degree, therefore, the grantee becomes the
tenant's landlord. However, one should not conclude that he is in all
respects a substitute landlord, having all rights and duties under the
lease. A few cases from other jurisdictions have, indeed, considered the
grantee a substitute landlord. 620 But the correct theory is that only
those covenants that touch and concern the land, i.e., the covenants
that are capable of running in the technical sense, will either bind or
benefit the grantee of the reversion. 621 We are assuming, after all, that
the landlord has only conveyed his land-his reversion-not that he has
made a contractual assignment of rights or delegation of duties under
the lease. That is why only those convenantal rights and duties that
are capable of running with his estate should devolve upon the grantee
of that estate. The right to rent is a running covenant; so, the Wash-
ington decisions to be cited in the later subsection are consistent with
the running covenant theory, but Washington has not had to consider
the abstract question.
Washington's recording act might allow a purchaser of the rever-
sion to take free and clear of an existing lease, though this is very un-
likely. As we previously saw, 6 22 leases for over two years are required
to be recorded, else they will be void against purchasers for value
without notice. If a tenant had an unrecorded lease for over two years,
it could be void against the landlord's grantee, provided the grantee
619. Hartford v. Faw, 166 Wash. 335, 7 P.2d 4(1932).
620. See, e.g., F. Groos & Co. v. Chittim, 100 S.W. 1006 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907);
Annot., 14 A.L.R. 664, 678 (1921).
621. See, e.g., Savings, Inc. v. City of Blytheville, 240 Ark. 558, 401 S.W.2d 26
(1966); 1 A.L.P. § 3.59.
622. See Part 1. 49 WASH. L. REV. at 324.
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lacked notice of the lease. Presumably the tenant's being in possession
would impart constructive notice, so that only in rare cases where he
was out of possession, the lease was unrecorded, and the purchaser
had no other form of notice would the lease be cut off. As to lease-
holds not over two years in length, which are not required to be re-
corded, it should follow that a purchaser of the reversion will always
take subject to them, even without notice.
By the original common-law rule, no rights or duties existed be-
tween the tenant and the landlord's grantee until the tenant "attorned"
to the latter. To attorn was simply to recognize the grantee, usually by
paying rent to him. The requirement of attornment was abolished in
England by the Statute of Anne of 1705,623 which has been substan-
tially copied in some states. Even without such statutes, attornment is
generally not required. 624 Washington has not clearly decided the
question, but it is doubtful that attornment would be required. Several
cases, holding that the grantee of the reversion is not entitled to rent
accrued before the date of his grant, seem to imply he is entitled to
rent for every day after the grant, without the necessity for attorn-
ment.625
C. Effect of Transfers
1. Effect of assignment
The tenant's assignee, by virtue of acquiring the leasehold estate,
comes into privity of estate with the landlord. Thus, even if he does
not receive an assignment of the rights and undertake a delegation of
duties in the contractual sense, he acquires the rights and duties from
and to the landlord insofar as these run with his leasehold estate.626
The Washington cases on the subject have dealt mostly with the as-
signee's duty to pay rent to the landlord. It is clear he has this direct
duty, at least until he divests himself of the leasehold. If he takes the
assignment during the last rental period of the lease, he has been held
623. 4 Anne, c. 16, §§ 9, 10.
624. 1 A.L.P. § 3.60.
625. See Muscatel v. Storey, 56 Wn. 2d 635, 354 P.2d 931 (1960); King County
v. Odman, 8 Wn. 2d 32, 11 P.2d 228 (1941); Kneeland Inv. Co. v. Aldrich, 63 Wash.
609, 116 P. 264 (1911).
626. See 1 A.L.P. § 3.61.
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to owe rent only for the portion of that period after the date of assign-
ment. 627 If his assignment is of only a portion of the premises, he owes
a proportionate share of the rent, the original tenant remaining liable
for the rest.628 In other ways, so far as Washington decisions have
determined, the assignee steps into the original tenant's shoes. 629 Once
again we should observe that, insofar as the assignee acquires duties, it
should be in theory only such duties as will run with his estate.
As a general proposition, assignment does not relieve the original
tenant of any duty to his landlord. The lease is both a contract and a
conveyance. Even though the assignee has come into privity of estate
with the landlord, the tenant remains in privity of contract with him
and is liable on his covenants. Therefore, the tenant remains liable for
the rent, at least where the lease contains an express covenant for
rent."30 This is so even if the landlord accepts rent from the assignee
or otherwise consents to the assignment." 3' Even where the rent is
adjusted upward on an adjustment formula after the assignment, the
tenant will likely be liable for the higher rent. 32 According to repeated
dictum, the original tenant will not remain liable for rent after assign-
ment if his duty to pay is "implied" and not "express," as where the
lease says only that rent is "reserved." 33
Of course the landlord may specifically release the original tenant
from his rent duty, either at the time of the assignment or by a lease
clause providing assignment shall constitute a release.634 Assuming the
627. Seattle Lodge 211, Loyal Order of Moose v. Par-T-Pak Beverage Co.. 55 Wn.
2d 587. 349 P.2d 229 (1960).
628. Johnson v. Zufeldt. 56 Wash. 5. 104 P. 1132 (1909).
629. See Teater v. King. 35 Wash. 138, 76 P. 688 (1904) (assignee takes subject
to sublease his assignor had made); McLennan v. Grant. 8 Wash. 603, 36 P. 682
(1894) (in suit by landlord, assignee, like original tenant, is estopped to deny land-
lord's title).
630. Cobb Healy Inv. Co. v. Tall, 181 Wash. 300. 42 P.2d 1107 (1935): Johnson
v. Goddard, 179 Wash. 493, 38 P.2d 208 (1934): Huston v. Graham. 169 Wash. 521.
14 P.2d 44 (1932) (apparent holding): Medgard v. Shimogaki. 135 Wash. 527. 238
P. 574 (1925). See also Ideal Inv. Co. v. Neely. 147 Wash. 667, 267 P. 46 (1928):
Gazzam v. Young. 114 Wash. 66, 194 P. 810(1921).
631. Johnson v. Goddard, 179 Wash. 493, 38 P.2d 208 (1934); Medgard v.
Shimogaki, 135 Wash. 527. 238 P. 574 (1925) (dictum); Johnson v. Norman. 98
Wash. 331, 167 P. 923 (1917) (dictum).
632. This is the holding in Johnson v. Norman, 98 Wash. 331, 167 P. 923 (1917).
though the court gave some emphasis to the fact that the tenant personally partici-
pated in making the appraisal upon which the rent increase was based.
633. National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P.2d 535 (1938)
(dictum); Johnson v. Goddard, 179 Wash. 493, 38 P.2d 208 (1934) (dictum).
634. Spaulding v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 164 Wash. 665, 4 P.2d 526 (1931)
(lease clause); Hardinger v. Lyons. 147 Wash. 174, 265 P. 166 (1928) (release at
time of assignment).
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parties intend that the original tenant shall be released from all duties
and the assignee be obligated to perform all, it would be advisable for
the assignee specifically to covenant to perform them or, perhaps bet-
ter, for the landlord and assignee to make a new lease. Otherwise, it is
possible the original tenant would be released from all covenants and
the assignee be liable to perform only the running covenants.
Jamison v. Reilly635 involves the interesting question of assignment
of a periodic (month-to-month) tenancy. A purported assignment, to-
gether with the landlord's acceptance of rent from the "assignee," was
held to terminate the original tenancy by surrender, relieving the orig-
inal tenant of liability for rent. Jamison is a case in which the original
three-year lease was void because not acknowledged, which, no doubt
to their surprise, left the parties on a month-to-month general letting.
The suggestion is that the parties should make sure they have a valid
tenancy for years before assignment.
A number of Washington cases have considered the effect of suc-
cessive assignments. If the first assignee did not separately undertake
to perform the lease covenants, his assignment relieves him of all fur-
ther liability to the landlord.636 This is for the sound reason that his
liability in the first instance arose out of his privity of estate with the
landlord, which, upon reassignment, is gone. He is permitted to escape
liability by reassigning, even though that was his motive for doing
S0.637 If, however, the first assignee has separately covenanted to be
liable to the landlord to perform the lease covenants, then he remains
liable after reassignment 638 by privity of contract, though he has lost
privity of estate. It would take the landlord's release to set him free.
2. Effect of sublease
Whereas an assignment brings the assignee into a direct relationship
with the original landlord, a sublease does not. Rather, there is a new,
secondary (hence, "sub") tenancy, with the head tenant becoming the
sublandlord of his subtenant. Between them, the principles of land-
635. 92 Wash. 538, 159 P. 699 (1916).
636. National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P.2d 535 (1938);
Tibbals v. Iffland, 10 Wash. 451, 39 P. 102 (1894).
637. Both of the decisions in the preceding footnote support this proposition.
638. Puget Mill Co. v. Kerry, 183 Wash. 542, 49 P.2d 57 (1935), overruling
Harvard Inv. Co. v. Smith, 66 Wash. 429, 119 P. 864 (1912); De Lano v. Tennent,
138 Wash. 39, 244 P. 273 (1926) (alternative holding).
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lord-tenant law generally apply. The head tenant may maintain an
action against his subtenant under the Washington unlawful detainer
statute.639 The familiar rules of tenant's trade fixtures apply. 640 But,
because there is neither privity of contract nor of estate between the
subtenant and the head landlord, the subtenant does not, at least out
of his subtenancy, acquire rights or duties to the latter. For instance, a
subtenant may not maintain an action against the head landlord on
the covenants of the head lease. 641
By the same token, the head tenant's act of subleasing does not re-
lease him from his obligations to the landlord under the head lease. 642
He may, in addition, have some exposure in that direction for acts
done by the subtenant that, if done by the head tenant, would breach
the latter's lease. As an example, if the head lease forbids certain ac-
tivities to be conducted on the premises and the subtenant carries on
those activities, the head tenant is in breach, and, if the head lease has
a forfeiture clause, the head landlord may terminate. 643 Of course if
the subtenant's act breached only the sublease, it would presumably
give the head tenant a cause of action, but should not give the head
landlord one. Also, it seems clear that the head landlord might have
an action against the subtenant not based upon a leasing relation, as,
say, when the subtenant does serious and permanent damage to the
premises.
Since the subtenancy is carved out of the head leasehold, it should
follow as a general proposition that the subtenant's rights rise no
higher than the head tenant's. 644 Thus, it should be accurate to say his
rights are subject to the provisions of the head lease, which, however,
is not to say the subtenant is necessarily subject to all the acts of the
head tenant. The Washington Supreme Court has decided that the
termination of the head tenancy terminates the sublease, and the sub-
tenant may not take advantage of a renewal option in the head lease if
639. Sanders v. General Petroleum Corp., 171 Wash. 250. 17 P.2d 890 (1933):
Erz v. Reese, 157 Wash. 32, 288 P. 255 (1930) (implied holding): Stahl Brewing &
Malting Co. v. Van Buren, 45 Wash. 451, 88 P. 837 (1907). See also Lyle v. Ginnold.
174 Wash. 104. 24 P.2d 449 (1933): Harris v. Halverson, 23 Wash. 779. 63 P. 549
(1901).
640. Hill's Garage v. Rice, 134 Wash. 101. 234 P. 1023 (1925) (implied holding).
641. Beebe v. Tyra, 49 Wash. 157, 94 P. 940 (1908).
642. Agen v. Nelson, 51 Wash. 431, 98 P. 1115(1909).
643. Shepard v. Dye, 137 Wash. 180. 242 P. 381(1926).
644. See Cuschner v. Westlake, 43 Wash. 690, 86 P. 948 (1906) (dictum).
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the immediate parties do not choose to renew. 645 But Washington also
appears to have followed the principle that subtenancies fall in with
termination of the head leasehold only when the latter naturally termi-
nates by the head lease's provisions. Thus, it has been held that a vol-
untary surrender of the head leasehold does riot end the subtenant's
right of possession, but leaves him as a tenant, apparently of the head
landlord.646 Termination according to the provisions of the head
lease, as where the head landlord exercises a power to terminate be-
cause of his tenant's breach, will cause the subtenancy to fall in.647
One might ask what the status of the subtenancy would be if the head
landlord and tenant effected termination by modifying their lease
after the subtenancy began, e.g., by shortening the term or adding a
termination clause. To such questions no answer appears in Wash-
ington. It is clear, then, that the subtenant has an inherently preca-
rious estate, it being dependent upon the infirmities of the head lease,
if not, perhaps, upon the whim of the parties to that lease. Therefore,
it would seem provident for the subtenant to seek some hedge against
this precariousness, possibly by the head landlord's agreement to rec-
ognize him as tenant if the head leasehold fell in, possibly by getting
the head tenant to provide him a bond or surety against early termina-
tion, possibly by some other device. 648
3. Effect of transfers of reversion
We previously speculated upon the extent to which the landlord's
conveyance of his reversion brings the grantee into a landlord-tenant
relation with the tenant. Though no Washington decision has been
found upon that abstract question, the correct principle should be that
the grantee takes subject to the leasehold estate and subject to the
benefit and burden of those covenants of the lease that will run with
his reversionary estate. He certainly takes subject to the tenant's pos-
645. McDuffie v. Noonan, 176 Wash. 436, 29 P.2d 684 (1934). See also Greene
v. Garrison, 107 Wash. 430, 181 P. 858 (1919).
646. Brewster Cigar Co. v. Atwood, 107 Wash. 639, 182 P. 564 (1919) (apparent
alternative holding); Cuschner v. Westlake, 43 Wash. 690, 86 P. 948 (1906).
647. Cuschner v. Westlake, 43 Wash. 690, 86 P. 948 (1906) (dictum); Shannon
v. Grindstaff, 11 Wash. 536, 40 P. 123 (1895).
648. See Brewster Cigar Co. v. Atwood, 107 Wash. 639, 182 P. 564 (1919), in
which the subtenant had gotten the head tenant to procure a surety against early
termination.
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sessory rights as contained in the lease. 649 Grantee and tenant may
cancel the leasehold by agreement and may presumably otherwise
modify the lease. 650 The grantee is entitled to rent coming due under
the lease, but, Washington has held, only to rent accruing after the
date he acquires title and not to that previously accrued though un-
paid. 651 Consistently, it has been determined that the purchaser at a
tax or mortgage foreclosure sale is entitled to rent coming due after
his purchase. 652 However, the possibility of a redemption creates some
special problems. It seems clear that the foreclosure purchaser's right
to rent would end, and the redemptioner's begin, at the date of re-
demption.6 53 And, according to the apparent holding in one old case,
because of the possibility redemption might occur any day, the fore-
closure purchaser may collect rent only at the end of rental periods,
even if the lease calls for rent in advance." 54
Because the above Washington decisions have been mostly preoc-
cupied with the grantee's right to receive rent, we do not know what
covenants other than the covenant to pay rent will run with the estate.
Take, for example, a complex shopping center lease. Will the tenant's
covenants to insure or to join the merchants' association or his radius
clause run to the benefit of the landlord's grantee? What about the
burden of the landlord's radius clause? Because the status of such
clauses is not well known generally, and not at all in Washington, it
would be the safe thing for the grantee and tenant to make a new
lease or to adopt it by an instrument having the formalities required
of a lease.
XI. TERMINATION
It will be well to bear in mind that in this final section we are consi-
dering those circumstances that will or may bring about a cessation of
649. See Roderick v. Swanson, 6 Wash. 222, 33 P. 349 (1893).
650. See State ex rel. Ratliffe v. Superior Court, 108 Wash. 443, 184 P. 348
(1919).
651. Muscatel v. Storey, 56 Wn. 2d 635, 354 P.2d 931 (1960): Kneeland Inv. Co.
v. Aldrich, 63 Wash. 609, 116 P. 264 (1911).
652. King County v. Odman, 8 Wn. 2d 32, I11 P.2d 228 (1941): Boston & Spo-
kane Realty Co. v. Franc Inv. Co., 112 Wash. 113, 191 P. 826 (1920); Byers v.
Rothschild, II Wash. 296, 39 P. 688 (1895).
653. Byers v. Rothschild. II Wash. 296, 39 P. 688 (1895).
654. Id.
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the leasehold estate, as distinguished from cessation of covenantal
undertakings. Generally the covenants will also end, they being in
their nature supportive of or dependent upon the leasehold. Yet, no
reason appears in law or logic why the parties might not include in the
leasing document undertakings quite incidental to the landlord-tenant
relation. As far as is known, the parties might agree to intermarry the
day after the leasehold ended or one might covenant to support the
other's aged mother, and these promises should be as remediable after
termination of the leasehold estate as if contained in a separate docu-
ment. Our only point in this discussion is that it is well to think sepa-
rately of the leasehold estate and of the lease covenants, to emphasize
that we are discussing here only the termination of the estate.
A. Normal Expiration of Term
1. Tenancy for years
In the words of R.C.W. § 59.04.030, "In all cases where premises
are rented for a specified time, by express or implied contract, the
tenancy shall be deemed terminated at the end of such specified time."
The 1973 Residential Landlord-Tenant Act contains identical lan-
guage. 655 This means the leasehold ends automatically at the end of
the fixed term of the tenancy for years, without notice or other act by
either party.656 A kind of statutory exception exists for agricultural
tenancies, which we should perhaps mention again here. If an agricul-
tural tenant holds over in possession for more than 60 days without a
notice to quit, then his tenancy is renewed for another full year.657
This, of course, is to protect him in his preparations for next year's
crop.
2. Periodic tenancy
An incident of the periodic tenancy is that it continues, period after
period, until one party terminates it by giving notice to the other. In
Washington the notice to end a periodic residential tenancy covered
655. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.220 (Supp. 1973).
656. Lowman v. Russell, 133 Wash. 10, 233 P. 9 (1925).
657. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.12.035 (1963); Bushnell v. Spencer, 122 Wash. 200,
210 P. 195 (1922).
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by the 1973 Landlord-Tenant Act must be given at least 20 days be-
fore the end of one of the rental periods. 658 With all other tenancies,
the notice must be given at least 30 days before the end of one of the
rental periods. 659 In all cases the notice must be "written." 660
Little case authority exists on the contents of the notice. It was
once held sufficient for a tenant to write a letter saying he was giving
up the premises as of the date of the letter, the effect being to
work a termination at the end of the earliest rental period that was
preceded by at least 30 days from receipt of the letter.661 The decision
takes a pretty relaxed attitude about the contents of the notice. A care-
fully drafted notice should state it is a notice that the party elects to
terminate the tenancy in described premises on a certain date. The
notice itself should be dated and signed by the landlord or his desig-
nated agent. And of course it should be delivered, by mail or other-
wise, to the other party at least 30 (or 20) days before the end of the
rental period that is fixed as the termination date.
3. Tenancy at will
The chief characteristic of a tenancy at will is that it, like a license,
is terminable at the will of either party. Najewitz v. City of Seattle,662
the only Washington case really dealing with tenancies at will,
seems to imply they are revocable without the need for any advance
notice. Washington's statutes requiring 20 or 30 days advance notice
to terminate periodic tenancies do not cover tenancies at will.663
About the only thing it seems safe to conclude for Washington is that
such tenancies are instantly terminable.
Some states have statutes requiring advance notice to terminate the
tenancy at will. In the absence of such a statute, the rule usually is
that it is terminable even without notice, such as by the tenant's aban-
658. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.200 (Supp. 1973).
659. Id. § 59.04.020 (1963). Compare id. § 59.12.030 (1963). which allows the
landlord to place his tenant in unlawful detainer, and so effectively to terminate, upon
20 days' notice.
660. Id. §§ 59.18.200 Supp. 1973) & 59.04.050(1963).
661. Worthington v. Moreland Motor Truck Co.. 140 Wash. 528. 250 P. 30
(1926).
662. 21 Wn. 2d 656, 152 P.2d 722 (1944).
663. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.200(Supp. 1973)& 59.04.050(1963).
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donment. But where the landlord cancels without advance notice, the
tenant is generally allowed a reasonable time to move out.664
4. Tenancy at sufferance
Because we do not know if the common-law tenancy at sufferance
even exists in Washington, 665 nothing can be said about that state's
rules for its termination. Washington does have R.C.W. § 59.04.050,
the curious statute that makes every disseisor a "tenant by sufferance,"
a status not at all like common-law tenancy at sufferance. Whatever
the statutory creature is, he must, by the statute, "forthwith on de-
mand surrender his said possession to the owner or person who had
the right of possession before said entry ......
With the common-law tenancy at sufferance, which occurs when a
tenant holds over without permission, the landlord may terminate the
status without notice. More precisely, the landlord is, probably by
operation of law, conferred with a power to treat the tenant as a tres-
passer or as a tenant, usually on a periodic tenancy.666 Either way the
landlord elects, he brings to an end the evanescent tenancy at suffer-
ance.
B. Special Limitation on Term
For the sake of clarity, let us block out the distinction between the
subjects to be considered in this section and in the next. Here we are
considering conditions that will cause the leasehold estate to fall in
automatically before the normal end of the term, without either party
exercising a power of termination. This is analogous to a determinable
fee that is limited, say, "so long as a school is operated on the prem-
ises." To speak with precision, we should say that when the condition
of school operation ceases to continue, the determinable fee ends au-
tomatically, and the possibility of reverter becomes a possessory fee.
The analogous leasehold would typically be limited upon somewhat
664. 1 A.L.P. § 3.92. See also suggestion to same effect in Najewitz v. City of
Seattle, 21 Wn. 2d 656, 659, 152 P.2d 722, 723 (1944).
665. See Part I, 49 WASH. L. REV. at 329.
666. 1 A.L.P. §§ 3.32-3.35.
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more direct language, such as, "this leasehold shall terminate if the
existing school is closed." By contrast, the leaseholds to be discussed
in Section XI-C infra are analogous to the fee upon condition
subsequent, for which appropriate language of condition might
be "but if a school ceases to operate on the premises, grantor may re-
enter and resume his former estate." If the condition occurs, and if a
re-entry is made physically or by court action, the fee upon condition
subsequent ends and the right of entry becomes the fee. Analogous to
this is the leasehold that is terminable only upon a party's exercise of a
power of termination, as where the landlord might "declare a forfeit-
ure" if the tenant closed the school. It is such powers of termination
that the next subsection will explore.
No reason exists in theory why a leasehold, or any estate, for that
matter, may not be specially limited. The most precise language of
condition that would cause the estate to terminate automatically is "so
long as," "during," or "until." More likely, the parties to a lease will
agree that the leasehold will "terminate" upon such-and-such an
event. If it is clear that the termination is to be automatic, then this
should be equivalent to the more precise phrasing.
While there are not a great many decisions on the topic in jurisdic-
tions outside Washington, there are enough to say the leasehold upon
special limitation is recognized. 66 7 The Washington situation is
clouded perhaps, because the court in the two decisions involving
clauses worded as special limitations construed them to be forfeiture
clauses. 668 In both cases the leaseholds were to "terminate" (or equiv-
alent language) upon the tenants' breaches of certain covenants. The
Washington court held that no terminations had occurred because the
landlords had not exercised powers of termination. Behind this
holding seems to be the reasoning that automatic termination would
allow the tenant to take advantage of his own breach. 669 While it is
unclear whether this is a rule of law or only of interpretation, it seems
doubtful that Washington intends to allow automatic termination for
a party's breach. It should still be possible to have such termination
conditioned upon other events, for instance, the landlord's sale of the
667. Id. § 3.89.
668. In re Estate of Murphy, 191 Wash. 180, 71 P.2d 6 (1937) (apparent hold-
ing); Cochran v. Lakota Land & Water Co., 171 Wash. 155. 17 P.2d 861 (1933).
669. See Cochran v. Lakota Land & Water Co., 171 Wash. 155. 17 P.2d 861
(1933).
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reversion, the tenant's going out of business, or condemnation of the
land. However, because of the two cases mentioned, the draftsman
ought to be very careful to use appropriate words of limitation and to
spell out his intent expressly and fully.
C. Powers of Termination
1. In general
We have already indicated that this subsection considers the device
that is analogous to the fee upon condition subsequent, i.e., one party
or the other has the power to terminate the leasehold. Possibly this
power may be exercisable at will, but more frequently it is exercisable
only upon the occurrence of some condition, such as the advent of a
breach by the other party or of a condemnation of the premises. Pop-
ularly, the process is called "forfeiture," but "power of termination"
more accurately reflects the legal theory at work.
The books will all say there is no power of termination save by
force of a clause specifically conferring it.67 0 Rescission for substantial
failure of performance, the contract doctrine, is not supposed to apply
to leasehold tenancies. The Supreme Court of Washington deliber-
ately said and flatly held in its 1964 opinion in University Properties
V. Moss6 7 1, however, that a tenant terminated his leasehold by rescis-
sion. Contract law authority was relied upon, and the words "rescind"
and "rescission" were repeatedly used. Although it may be true that
there is no other clear authority for leasehold rescission in Washing-
ton, there the Moss case is strong, recent, and pregnant. Litigants
should force the court to clarify what it meant.
The simplest form of termination clause is one that allows one
party or the other unconditionally to terminate by giving the other
party notice. A possible argument against such a clause is that it
makes the tenancy at the will of one party and, therefore, by the doc-
trine of mutuality, a tenancy at the will of both landlord and tenant.
Washington has rejected this argument and has upheld the uncondi-
tional termination clause.672
670. See I A.L.P. § 3.94.
671. 63 Wn. 2d 619, 388 P.2d 543 (1964).
672. Peoples Park & Amusement Ass'n v. Anrooney, 200 Wash. 51, 93 P.2d 362
(1939). See also Preugschat v. Hedges, 41 Wn. 2d 660, 251 P.2d 166 (1952), which
contains a suggestion that an unconditional clause would be enforceable.
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Often the exercise of the termination power is conditioned upon
some event other than the other party's breach of a covenant. Exam-
ples of such events are the landlord's sale of the premises,67 his desire
to erect a building,"74 the tenant's sale of his business,"75 and a condem-
nation of the premises." 7" Most of the cases have dealt with interpre-
tations of particular clauses. An interpretation that may be of general
interest is that a "sale of the premises" occurs when an installment con-
tract is executed, even though the vendor retains title as security" 77
Frequently one party's power to terminate is conditioned upon the
other's breach of any specified covenant or covenants of the lease.
Except for the rescission doctrine announced in Moss, one party's
breach does not give the other a power of termination unless that
power is created by a lease clause."7 8 Some statutory exceptions, of
sorts, exist in Washington. R.C.W. § 59.04.040 provides that, "When a
tenant fails to pay rent when the same is due, and the landlord notifies
him to pay said rent or quit the premises within ten days, unless the
rent is paid within said ten days, the tenancy shall be forfeited at the
end of said ten days." The landlord then has an ejectment action.37:1
A more specialized statute, R.C.W. § 4.24.080, allows the landlord
to use ejectment against any tenant who allows the premises to be used
for "gambling purposes." We also have the several unlawful detainer
statutes, but these will be considered separately in the Section XI-D
infra.
A general termination clause, allowing a party, say, the landlord, to
terminate for any and all breaches will, as written, cover a breach of
any covenant, including the covenant not to assign without the land-
lord's consent."80 Termination under such a clause cuts the leasehold
673. See Pierce v. Mountain Lion Consol. Mines Co., 183 Wash. 629. 49 P.2d 23
(1935): Druxinman v. Smith, 113 Wash. 124, 193 P. 224 (1920).
674. See Clise nv. Co. v. Stone. 168 Wash. 617, 13 P.2d 9(1932).
675. See Shannon v. Grindstaff, I I Wash. 536, 40 P. 123 (1895).
676. See State v. Sheets, 48 Wn. 2d 65, 290 P.2d 974(1955).
677. Pierce v. Mountain Lion Consol. Mines Co., 183 Wash. 629, 49 P.2d 23
(1935): Druxinman v.Smith, 113 Wash. 124, 193 P. 224(1920).
678. Moore v. Twin City Ice & Cold Storage Co.. 92 Wash. 608, 159 P. 779
(1916).
679. Verline v. Hyssop, 2 Wn. 2d 141, 97 P.2d 653 (1940). The court laid its de-
cision on another statute, REM. REV. STAT. § 812, which is now WASH. REV. CODE §
59.12.030 (1963). By a mistake, id. § 59.04.040 (1963). the statute cited in the text.
had been omitted from Remington's Revised Statutes. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.12.030
(1963) does not support the decision in Verline, but id. 59.04.040 (1963) does. So it
seems fair to conclude that the case allows ejectment in connection with the latter
statute.
680. Boyd v. North, 114 Wash. 540. 195 P. 1011(1921).
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short and has been distinguished in its effect from the normal running
out of the term.681 Nevertheless, the exercise of the power brings the
tenancy to an end as effectively as would the end of the term. The
tenant's estate ends, and he has no further interest in the incidents of
the leasehold.682 Likewise, the landlord has no right to rent for any
period after the effective termination date.683 However, the termina-
tion clause sometimes expressly allows the landlord to charge the
tenant rent after termination until the normal end of the term or until
the premises are re-let, and such a provision will be enforced.084
Throughout this discussion, it should be borne in mind that no ter-
mination occurs at all unless the party having the power gives any no-
tice required by the lease. It has, in fact, been held that if the lease
requires the party to give the other a period of time to correct the
breach, notice of that period must be given, even if the breach is one
that could not possibly be corrected.685
The decision in Republic Investment Co. v. Naches Hotel Co. 686
poses an unusual problem for the Washington draftsman. It was held
there that, where a lease allows a landlord (or, presumably, a tenant)
to terminate upon 60-days' notice, the giving of the 60-day notice was
also a condition to maintaining an action for damages. The reasoning
seems to be that the parties intended that no breach would occur until
after the 60-day notice period. Odd as this result may seem, one wants
to draft around it. This might be done by providing that the promisee
shall have a power to terminate or, at his election and as though the
termination clause did not exist, to sue for damages or to pursue any
other remedy allowed by law.
2. Waiver
A party having the power to terminate upon occurrence of a breach
or some other condition may lose the power by waiver. In general,
681. See Preugschat v. Hedges, 41 Wn. 2d 660, 251 P.2d 166 (1952); Klingen-
berg v. Gustin, 2 Wn. 2d 617, 99 P.2d 399 (1940).
682. State v. Sheets, 48 Wn. 2d 65, 290 P.2d 974 (1955) (after termination ten-
ant may not share in condemnation award); Kelley v. Von Herberg, 184 Wash. 165,
50 P.2d 23 (1935); Stetson & Post Mill Co. v. Pacific Amusement Co., 37 Wash. 335,
79 P. 935 (1905) (after termination, leasehold estate ends).
683. Heuss v. Olson, 43 Wn. 2d 901, 264 P.2d 875 (1953).
684. Id. (dictum); Metropolitan Nat'l Bank v. Hutchinson Realty Co., 157 Wash.
522, 289 P. 56 (1930).
685. Gray v. Gregory, 36 Wn. 2d 416, 218 P.2d 307 (1950).
686. 190 Wash. 176, 67 P.2d 858 (1937).
1067
Washington Law Review
this occurs when he fails to pursue his remedy under circumstances
indicating he does not intend to do so. If, with knowledge of a breach,
he fails to exercise the power within a reasonable time, this has been
held a waiver. 687 Even after notice of termination is given, there can
be a waiver if the party waits too long to take further action when the
other party ignores the notice.68 8 The commonest form of waiver oc-
curs when a landlord, knowing his tenant has breached, accepts rent
before giving notice of termination. 68 9 Dictum in one opinion states
that when the breach is a continuing one, knowing acceptance of rent
will normally waive so much of the breach as occurred before accep-
tance, but not the subsequent part.6 9 0
3. Equitable relief
Since termination of the leasehold is viewed as working a forfeiture,
equity may in certain circumstances intervene to prevent it. Courts in
other jurisdictions have refused to allow termination, usually where
the breach was only the failure to pay a sum of money, such as rent or
taxes. The promisee could be made whole if the sum was paid, though
late, upon trial.691 One Washington case has been found containing
dictum that a court of equity might grant a tenant an extension of
time to prevent a forfeiture. 692 So, any statements about equitable re-
lief against termination in Washington would be speculative.
D. Unlawful Detainer
Unlawful detainer statutes are an exception to the normal rule that
one party's breach of his lease covenants does not empower the other
to terminate. Three Washington statutes will be considered here: (1)
the principal unlawful detainer act, R.C.W. Chapter 59.12; (2) cer-
687. Pacific Warehouse Co. v. McKenzie-Hunt Paper Co.. 80 Wash. 489. 141 P.
1147 (1914) (six months unreasonable).
688. Ennis v. Ring, 49 Wn. 2d 284, 300 P.2d 773 (1956); Ennis v. Ring. 56 Wn.
2d 465, 341 P.2d 885 (1959) (four months too long to bring suit after 30-day notice).
689. Schultz v. Cardwell, 142 Wash. 489, 253 P. 822 (1927) (dictum); Batley v.
Dewalt, 56 Wash. 431, 105 P. 1029 (1909): Pettygrove v. Rothschild. 2 Wash. 6. 25
P. 907 (1891) (dictum).
690. Schultz v. Cardwell, 142 Wash. 489, 253 P. 822 (1927) (dictum). Under the
peculiar facts of the case, it was held no waiver at all occurred.
691. 1 A.L.P. § 3.96.
692. Abrams v. City of Seattle, 173 Wash. 495, 23 P.2d 869 (1933) (dictum).
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tain modifications of that statute regarding residential tenancies under
the 1973 Residential Landlord-Tenant Act;693 and (3) R.C.W.
Chapter 59.08, which does not truly operate on the unlawful detainer
principle. All the statutes have this common feature: They allow the
landlord to terminate the tenancy because of certain acts or defaults
by the tenant. For purposes of organization, we will discuss the three
statutes separately.
1. R.C.W. Chapter 59.12
The main object of R.C.W. Chapter 59.12 is to give the landlord a
speedy, efficient way of evicting a tenant. What might be termed sec-
ondary remedies, damages, rent, and penalties, may also be allowed,
but the main object is eviction. Before the unlawful detainer act was
adopted in 1890, the common-law rule was that when the tenant's
right of possession ended, the landlord was privileged to use reasonable
physical force to evict him. Unlawful detainer actions give the land-
lord a trade-off. He no longer is permitted to use physical force, but
he is given a speedy judicial remedy, and he is permitted to terminate
the leasehold in situations in which it could not have been terminated
under the common-law rule. 694 Since the subject is entirely statutory,
it will be convenient, if not wholly logical, first to sketch in the stat-
ute's salient features, then to discuss the Washington cases interpreting
it. Please note that we will only "sketch" some "salient" features of a
detailed statute. Anyone working with the statute must have it open
before him.
Precisely speaking, "unlawful detainer" is a status, meaning that a
tenant in that status is unlawfully detaining possession of the land-
lord's land. There are six ways one may enter that status. In five of the
six there must be a prior notice by the landlord, the status not arising
until a period of time, varying from three to 20 days, has elapsed after
notice. Following is an outline of the six ways, with the period of no-
tice noted in parentheses: (1) holding over after the end of a fixed
term (no notice required); (2) holding a periodic tenancy after notice
to quit (20 days); (3) default in rent (three days); (4) breach of any
covenant other than a covenant to pay rent (10 days); (5) committing
693. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.370-.410 (Supp. 1973).
694. Nelson v. Swanson, 177 Wash. 187, 31 P.2d 521 (1934).
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or permitting waste, conducting an unlawful business, or conducting
or permitting a nuisance (three days); and (6) one who enters as a tres-
passer (three days). In cases (3) and (4) the tenant may escape un-
lawful detainer by curing his default or breach within the notice pe-
riod. 695
Not only must the notice be in the statutory form, but it must be
served in one of three prescribed ways. 696 Because of Professor Peck's
article, Landlord and Tenant Notices, we will simply observe at this
point that compliance with the statutory notice provisions is jurisdic-
tional and must be proven. 697 Professor Peck's article should be con-
sulted for the many further aspects of the subject.
Assuming the notice period has passed and, if he is allowed to do
so, the tenant has failed to cure his breach, he then is in unlawful de-
tainer. The landlord's cause of action then arises, and he may com-
mence suit by a summons and complaint. There are again special statu-
tory requirements; for instance, the return day on the summons must
be no less than six, and no more than 12, days from service, unless
service is by publication. 698 At the commencement of the action or at
any time thereafter, the landlord may obtain possession under an ex
parte writ of restitution, issued upon a bond.699 But the tenant may
defeat restitution and retain possession pendente lite by posting a
counter-bond, with a hearing upon the bond's sufficiency.700
In the principal action, if the defendant fails to answer he may be
defaulted, 701 or the matter will move on for trial if he answers. Trial
may be by jury, and the action is to be set for trial in precedence to
"all other civil actions. '70 2 If the landlord, or one occupying his posi-
tion, prevails at the trial, he must be awarded a judgment for restitu-
tion of the premises and for twice the amount of any damages and
rent found due. 70 3 When the unlawful detainer action is brought for
695. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.12.030(1963).
696. Id. § 59.12.040(1963).
697. Peck. Landlord and Tenant Notices, 31 WASH. L. REV. 51. 52 (1956). See
also, Sowers v. Lewis, 49 Wn. 2d 891. 307 P.2d 1064 (1957); Thisius v. Sealander.
26 Wn. 2d 810, 175 P.2d 619 (1946); Jeffries v. Spencer, 86 Wash. 133, 149 P. 651
(1915).
698. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.12.070. .080(1963).
699. Id. § 59.12.090.
700. Id. § 59.12.100.
701. Id.§ 59.12.120.
702. Id. § 59.12.130.
703. Id. § 59.12.170.
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rent default, judgment will be suspended for five days, during which
the tenant or any other interested person, such as a subtenant or mort-
gagee of the leasehold, may keep the leasehold alive by paying the
judgment.704 Any tenant may, on equitable grounds, be relieved of the
forfeiture of his leasehold if he or some other interested person applies
for this relief within 30 days after judgment, provided defaults and
breaches are cured "so far as the same is practicable.' ' 705 The statute
also contains special provisions for a stay bond and for suspension of
the writ of restitution pending an appeal.70 6
The foregoing, then, are the chief features of R.C.W. Chapter
59.12. We now turn to the decisions interpreting and glossing the
statute.
Unlawful detainer actions are possessory. Title is not in issue, so
that if the defendant admits he occupies by the plaintiff's permission,
he is not allowed to defend on the ground that the plaintiff lacked
title.707 The plaintiff must have the right of possession at the time of
judgment. 708 While usually the plaintiff is an owner-landlord, it is set-
tled that unlawful detainer may be maintained equally well by a head
tenant against his subtenant.7 09 Where the original landlord has sold
the premises to a contract purchaser who has the underlying right to
possession, it is the purchaser and not the original landlord who may
bring unlawful detainer.7 10 A landlord may use the action against his
tenant if the tenant's subtenant commits an act of unlawful de-
tainer.71 1 When there has been an assignment of the leasehold, the land-
lord has an unlawful detainer action directly against the assignee, be-
cause, in contrast with a subtenancy, there is a landlord-tenant relation
between landlord and assignee. 71 2 As previously noted, the unlawful
detainer statute expressly allows a landowner to use the action against
704. Id.
705. Id. § 59.12.190.
706. Id. §§ 59.12.200-.220.
707. Deckerv. Verloop, 73 Wash. 10, 131 P. 190(1913).
708. MacRae v. Way, 64 Wn. 2d 544, 392 P.2d 827 (1964).
709. This is implicit in the following decisions: MacRae v. Way, 64 Wn. 2d 544,
392 P.2d 827 (1964); Lyle v. Ginnold, 174 Wash. 104, 24 P.2d 449 (1933); Erz v.
Reese, 157 Wash. 32, 288 P. 255 (1930); Harris v. Halverson, 23 Wash. 779, 63
P. 549 (1901).
710. Thisius v. Sealander, 26 Wn. 2d 810, 175 P.2d 619 (1946).
711. Shepard v. Dye, 137 Wash. 180, 242 P. 381 (1926).
712. Sheridan v. 0. E. Doherty, Inc., 106 Wash. 561, 181 P. 16(1919).
1071
Washington Law Review
a trespasser, who is not a tenant at all, after a three-day notice. 713 Alter-
natively, it seems the landowner might treat the trespasser as a "tenant
by sufferance" under R.C.W. § 59.04.050 and maintain unlawful
detainer against him in that capacity.714 Or, as a third alternative, it
also seems the landowner might make the trespasser an implied tenant
by demanding rent of him, then using unlawful detainer. 71 5 It has
been held that this form of action may not be used to remove a con-
tract purchaser. 716
Unlawful detainer is a specialized, strictly statutory form of action.
We have seen that notices must conform to the statutory require-
ments.717 Likewise, failure to use the statutory form of summons is
fatal and cannot be cured by issuing a new summons in the same ac-
tion. 71 8 Once an action has been commenced in unlawful detainer, it
may not be converted by either party into an action to try questions
beyond those enumerated in the statute. One opinion characterizes the
court as "to all intents and purposes, sitting as a special tribunal, re-
stricted to the determination of a special statutory proceeding. . . and
[with] no jurisdiction to determine any other issue than that present-
able under the special statute. '719 Thus, the plaintiff may not turn it
into an ordinary action for rent, 720 to foreclose a rent lien,721 for
ejectment, 722 for injunction, 723 or to determine ownership of person-
alty on the premises.724 Such questions would have to be tried in a
separate action. However, questions that the statute permits to be re-
solved in the unlawful detainer action must be adjudicated there, or
713. Lake Union Realty Co. v. Woolfield. 119 Wash. 331. 205 P. 14 (1922):
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Munson, 115 Wash. 119, 196 P. 633 (1921).
714. Williamson v. Hallett, 108 Wash. 176. 182 P. 940 (1919) (alternative
ground).
715. Id. (alternative ground).
716. Rayburn v. Stewart-Calvert Co., 105 Wash. 575, 178 P. 455 (1919).
717. Peck, Landlord and Tenant Notices, 31 WASH. L. REV. 51. i2 (1956). See
also, Sowers v. Lewis, 49 Wn. 2d 891, 307 P.2d 1064 (1957); Thisius v. Sealander.
26 Wn. 2d 810, 175 P.2d 619 (1946); Jeffries v. Spencer, 86 Wash. 133, 149 P. 651
(1915).
718. Big Bend Land Co. v. Huston, 98 Wash. 640, 168 P. 470 (1917).
719. State ex rel. Seaborn Shipyards Co. v. Superior Court. 102 Wash. 215, 217.
172 P. 826. 826-27 (1918).
720. Tuschoffv. Westover, 65 Wn. 2d 69, 395 P.2d 630 (1964).
721. Yukon Inv. Co. v. Crescent Meat Co., 140 Wash. 136, 248 P. 377 (1926).
722. Jeffries v. Spencer, 86 Wash. 133, 149 P. 651 (1915).
723. State ex rel. Seaborn Shipyards Co. v. Superior Court. 102 Wash. 215. 172
P. 826 (1918).
724. Little v. Catania, 48 Wn. 2d 890, 297 P.2d 255 (1956) (dictum).
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the plaintiff is barred from raising them later.725 Similarly, the un-
lawful detainer action is res judicata on questions that are resolved in
it.726
Because of the principle just adverted to, that unlawful detainer is a
limited, statutory form of action, Washington has traditionally been
very restrictive as to defenses that may be interposed. That tradition
now is in considerable disarray, but we will first discuss the tradition,
then the cause of the disarray. Two old decisions appear to hold that
defendants who admittedly had been tenants might not defend upon
the affirmative ground that they were entitled to possession under ar-
rangements that superseded the leases. In one case, the tenant was not
allowed to show he had become a possessory contract purchaser;727 in
the other it was no defense that the tenant, having eminent domain
power, had commenced a condemnation action, the commencement
of which gave him the right of possession.728 But these cases seem
contrary to a later one, in which a tenant was allowed to defend on
the ground that a separate agreement, made after the lease, gave him
rent-free possession.729 In theory, the defendant ought to be able to
raise any affirmative defense that, in effect, contravenes the claim that
he is in as the owner's tenant.
Somewhat different is the situation in which the tenant admits he is
a tenant, admits he has breached the lease, defaulted in his rent, or
whatever, and then pleads a set-off or a counterclaim. Until Foisy v.
Wyman 730 came along in the Fall of 1973, there was, in the words of
Young v. Riley,731 "an unbroken line of decisions that in such pro-
ceeding the defendant may not assert a set-off or counterclaim." In-
deed, there was a line of cases so holding, stretching from the first
unlawful detainer decision, Ralph v. Lomer, in 1891, to Sundholm v.
Patch, in 1963.732 The defendant might assert his claim in a separate
725. Munro v. Irwin, 163 Wash. 452, 1 P.2d 329 (1931).
726. Angel v. Ladas, 143 Wash. 622, 255 P. 945 (1927).
727. Bond v. Chapman, 34 Wash. 606, 76 P. 97 (1904).
728. Morris v. Healy Lumber Co., 33 Wash. 451, 74 P. 662 (1903).
729. Taylor v. Basye, 119 Wash. 263, 205 P. 16 (1922).
730. 83 Wn. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
731. 59 Wn. 2d 50, 52, 365 P.2d 769 (1961).
732. Sundholm v. Patch, 62 Wn. 2d 244, 382 P.2d 262 (1963); Young v. Riley,
59 Wn. 2d 50, 365 P.2d 769 (1961); Chung v. Louie Fong Co., 130 Wash. 154, 226
P. 726 (1924); Carmack v. Drum, 27 Wash. 382, 67 P. 808 (1902); Phillips v. Port
Townsend Lodge No. 6, F. & A.M., 8 Wash. 529, 36 P. 476 (1894); Ralph v. Lomer,
3 Wash. 401, 28 P. 760 (1891). Other decisions contain dictum to the same effect.
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action as plaintiff and might, from that springboard, possibly enjoin
the unlawful detainer action, 733 but he could not assert it in the latter
action itself. To permit a set-off or counterclaim, the court reasoned,
would introduce a question extraneous to the strict, statutory basis for
unlawful detainer.
Foisy v. Wyman was an unlawful detainer action based upon de-
fault in the payment of rent. The tenant defended on the ground that
he had a set-off for damages arising out of the landlord's breach of an
implied warranty of habitability. Holding, for the first time, that this
implied warranty exists in all residential leases, the court further held
the damages could be set off against unpaid rent. If the set-off was
found on remand to equal the rent due, the unlawful detainer action
would be defeated. The court reasoned that the defense went to the
basis of the action, nonpayment of rent, and therefore did not intro-
duce a question beyond the statutory one. Not one of the earlier deci-
sions was cited or alluded to in any way.
What is the effect of Foisy v. Wyman on the earlier decisions? One
should make a distinction between set-offs or counterclaims that can,
and those that cannot, extinguish the basis for the unlawful detainer
action. In almost all cases that can be imagined, this means they
should be entertained as a defense only when the action is upon a
three-day notice for rent default. Conceivably set-offs or counter-
claims may be allowable in an action upon a ten-day notice for the
breach of some unusual covenant calling for the payment of money to
the landlord other than as rent. To that extent the earlier cases must
be overruled by implication. But when the unlawful detainer is laid on
another ground, the point of the earlier opinions seems still well
taken: the defendant should not be allowed to turn the specialized,
expedited form of action into a forum to sue his landlord. He should
not, in that forum, be allowed to sue his landlord for damages for,
say, failing to make repairs, just because the landlord seeks to evict
him for, say, maintaining an illegal business. It might be questioned,
too, whether, even in an action for nonpayment of rent, the tenant
should be allowed to counterclaim or set off a claim arising outside
the landlord-tenant relation. One upshot of Foisy v. Wyman is that
unlawful detainer actions laid on the ground of rent default will be
susceptible to delay and uncertainty from claimed set-offs. In many
733. Income Properties Inv. Co. v. Trefethen. 155 Wash. 493. 284 P. 782 (1930).
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cases the landlord may be in a less vulnerable position if he will
forego the three-day notice for nonpayment of rent and lay his action
on some other breach or even lay it on the general 20-day notice,
which are grounds for unlawful detainer that are not negated by an
affirmative defense for money damages.
A frequent defense in unlawful detainer actions has been that the
landlord has waived the breach upon which he grounded his action by
accepting rent after he serves his notice. The basic Washington posi-
tion is that, by accepting rent, he waives all past breaches.734 When
the breach is a continuing one, even though future breach apparently
is not waived, the past part is, with the result that the unlawful de-
tainer notice, being based on the past part, is nullified.7 35 It has been
held, however, that acceptance of rent does not waive breaches when
the lease contains a provision stating that acceptance shall not consti-
tute a waiver.736 In addition, according to an 1893 decision, the land-
lord does not waive defaults in rent by accepting rent after a three-day
notice if he applies the receipts to earliest rent first and there is still
some rent owing for the period before the notice.737
When the unlawful detainer action is predicated upon the fourth
ground, breach of a covenant other than a covenant to pay rent, the
landlord must specify in the notice the breaches upon which he relies.
At trial he will be limited to establishing only those breaches thus
specified. 738 As a general rule, the breach of any covenant will suffice.
However, there is one case in which the court refused judgment for
the landlord on the ground that the breach was slight and technical.739
Underlying the decision is the theory that a court of equity abhors a
forfeiture; in effect, the court balanced the equities.
We have seen that the unlawful detainer statute allows the landlord
restitution at the commencement of the action, but the tenant may
retain possession by posting a counterbond. Suppose the tenant
734. Signal Oil Co. v. Stebick, 40 Wn. 2d 599, 245 P.2d 217 (1952); Wilson v.
Daniels, 31 Wn. 2d 633, 198 P.2d 496 (1948). Wilson should be studied especially
carefully. The landlord accepted rent the day before he gave notice. The breaches
were continuing ones. In holding that acceptance was a waiver, the court seems to
reason that the waiver continued for "some time" into the future, at least to the next
day. On this point the decision seems weak.
735. Signal Oil Co. v. Stebick, 40 Wn. 2d 599, 245 P.2d 217 (1952); Wilson v.
Daniels, 31 Wn. 2d 633, 198 P.2d 496 (1948).
736. Hutchinson Inv. Co. v. Van Nostern, 99 Wash. 549, 170 P. 121 (1918).
737. Carraher v. Bell, 7 Wash. 81, 34 P. 469 (1893).
738. Thisius v. Sealander, 26 Wn. 2d 810, 175 P.2d 619 (1946).
739. Deming v.Jones, 173 Wash. 644, 24 P.2d 85 (1933).
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thereby retains possession during the pendency of the action; then,
upon final judgment, the landlord is held to have been entitled to resti-
tution. What remedy does the landlord have for the tenant's retention
of what now appears to have been wrongful possession? R.C.W. §
59.12.100 says the plaintiff may recover on the counterbond "for the
use and occupation of the said premises, or any rent found due, to-
gether with all damages the plaintiff may sustain by reason of the de-
fendant occupying or keeping possession of said premises, and also all
the costs of the action." Golden v. Mount740 considered the landlord's
recovery under this statute when the tenant raised crops while he
wrongfully occupied under a counterbond; it held the landlord was
entitled to the value of the crops, less the tenant's costs of raising
them, including an allowance for his labor.
If the plaintiff prevails upon trial, in addition to restitution of the
premises, he is entitled to money damages. 741 These damages include
all rent that was owing at the time the tenant entered the status of un-
lawful detainer, i.e., when he began holding over after expiry of the
notice. The tenant is not liable for any rent that had been paid by that
time,74 2 nor for which he had given a promissory note.743 Because
expiration of the notice terminates the lease, after that point the mea-
sure of the landlord's damages apparently is not the rental fixed in the
lease but the land's fair rental value.74 4 In actions brought on any of
the unlawful detainer grounds (not merely for rent default), the plain-
tiff is entitled to judgment for double the amount of rent plus dam-
ages. 745 To some extent, though the cases do not form a very coherent
pattern, the Washington court has placed some limitations on this
double recovery. One senior opinion held that damages could be dou-
bled only for the period the tenant was in the unlawful detainer status
and not for anything accruing after he finally vacated. 746 Some ques-
tion may exist on whether a liquidated damages clause in a lease will
prevent a doubling of rent and perhaps of other damages. A 1911 de-
740. 32 Wn. 2d 653, 203 P.2d 667 (1949).
741. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.12.170 (1963).
742. Lochridge v. Natsuhara, 114 Wash. 326, 194 P. 974(1921).
743. Walkerv. Myers, 166 Wash. 392,7 P.2d 21 (1932).
744. Owens v. Layton, 133 Wash. 346, 233 P. 645 (1925). But see Lee v. Deben-
tures, Inc., 8 Wn. 2d 353, 112 P.2d 142 (1941) (dictum suggesting, but not directly
stating, a contrary result).
745. WAsH. REV. CODE § 59.12.170 (1963); Swanson v. Stubb, 108 Wash. 170.
183 P. 91 (1919); Hinckley v. Casey, 45 Wash. 430, 88 P. 753 (1907).
746. Shannon v. Loeb, 65 Wash. 640, 118 P. 823 (1911).
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cision holds such a clause does not impede an award of doubled rent,
on the apparent theory that the lease provisions, including the liqui-
dated damages clause, were made subject to the statute.747 We saw
earlier, though, that a clause that gives liquidated damages for a rent
default will limit the landlord's recovery to that amount.748 From this
it might be argued at least that the outer limit should be double the
amount of liquidated damages, if not the single amount. Finally,
emphasis must be placed on a court-imposed limitation that is a veri-
table bear trap for the unwary plaintiffs lawyer: the plaintiff may not
recover double rent or damages unless he specifically prays for it in
his complaint.7 49 He had better use the word "double," because gen-
eral phrases, like "rent. . .as provided by law," will not do.750
2. The 1973 Residential Landlord-Tenant Act
Unlawful detainer actions, as generally provided for in R.C.W.
Chapter 59.12, may be used for tenancies covered by the 1973 Resi-
dential Landlord-Tenant Act, but with important modifications con-
tained in the Act. These modifications will be briefly summarized.
At least in theory, the Act creates some extension of the pre-existing
grounds for unlawful detainer. Sections 13 and 14 of the Act spell out
tenants' duties, some of which appear broader, if not different, than
their common-law duties.75' For example, and of special interest here,
the tenant must keep his premises as clean as conditions permit, must
dispose of rubbish and garbage, must properly use certain appliances,
and must conform to the landlord's reasonable rules of occupancy.
Violations of these duties, or of any of the duties of Sections 13 and
14, are, by Section 18, made acts of unlawful detainer if the violations
are "substantial.1752 Previously, as we know, R.C.W. Chapter 59.12
had made waste, nuisances, and illegal activities acts of unlawful de-
tainer. It appears that, even with the qualification "substantial," the
747. O'Connell v. Arai, 63 Wash. 280, 115 P. 95 (1911).
748. See subsection VI-G-2 supra and especially Mon Wai v. Parks, 43 Wn. 2d
562, 262 P.2d 196 (1953).
749. Peterson v. Crockett, 158 Wash. 631, 291 P. 721 (1930); Gaffney v. Meg-
rath, II Wash. 456, 39 P. 973 (1895); Hall & Paulson Furn. Co. v. Wilbur, 4 Wash.
644, 30 P. 665 (1892).
750. Peterson v. Crockett, 158 Wash. 631, 291 P. 721 (1930).
751. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.130 & .140 (Supp. 1973).
752. Id. § 59.18.180.
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residential tenant may now in some imaginable circumstances commit
acts of unlawful detainer that would not have run into the interdiction
of R.C.W. Chapter 59.12. Section 18 of the Act does, however,
leave some doubt about the kind of unlawful detainer notice that
should be used, and the provision should be studied.
The Act makes a major change in the procedure for obtaining a
writ of restitution pendente lite. The plaintiff must now have a hearing
on a show-cause order upon notice, no less than six, and no more than
12, days after service of the order.753 At the hearing the court shall
orally examine the parties and witnesses and, in addition to acting on
the writ of restitution, may grant or deny the plaintiff other relief as to
which there is no substantial issue of fact. The defendant may assert
set-offs at this hearing, as well as legal and equitable defenses. In
order to obtain restitution anytime before trial, the plaintiff must still
file a bond, as under R.C.W. Chapter 59.12. The defendant may stay
restitution until trial by paying any rent the court finds due, "all the
costs of the action" (how can they be fixed at the hearing on the
writ?), and by paying rent monthly pending trial; no counterbond is
required as in R.C.W. Chapter 59.12. If the court finds the plaintiff is
not entitled to restitution, he shall order the parties to proceed to trial
within 30 days. Apparently, at this show-cause hearing, the judge has
the power to enter judgment for either party on any demand or de-
fense as to which there is no substantial factual dispute, other than for
restitution.754
If the plaintiff qualifies for and gets his writ of restitution, the
sheriff serves it on the defendant. At that point the defendant has an-
other chance to forestall restitution. He may do so within three days
by posting a counterbond, which is essentially the same as the proce-
dure of R.C.W. Chapter 59.12. The bond is similar, except for some
changes in the condition of the obligation, to conform to differences
between the Act and R.C.W. Chapter 59.12. 7 55
The defendant is permitted expressly to raise equitable defenses and
set-offs in his answer,756 which, until Foisy v. Wyman, 757 was not al-
753. Id. § 59.18.370.
754. Id.
755. Id. § 59.18.390.
756. Id. § 59.18.400.
757. 83 Wn. 2d 22. 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
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lowed under R.C.W. Chapter 59.12.758 On trial, matters are handled
substantially the same as under R.C.W. Chapter 59.12, with one huge
exception: the landlord no longer may have double damages or
double rent.7 59 Instead, he is entitled to rent and damages, "and the
court may award statutory costs and reasonable attorney's fees." (Em-
phasis added.) It looks as if the landlords' lobbyists let a serious loop-
hole (from their point of view) slip through by use of the word
"may." Perhaps they figured that money judgments are uncollectible,
anyhow, and inconsequential, as long as restitution can be had.
3. R.C.W. Chapter 59.08
R.C.W. Chapter 59.08 provides for a summary mode of eviction
when the agreed rent or the rental value is $40 per month or less. The
statute, in its ten sections, does not use the words "unlawful detainer,"
but it operates something like an unlawful detainer statute. It would
be interesting to know how many $40-a-month leases there are in the
state; obviously, the statute must have had fairly limited utility, even
when passed in 1941.
The statute allows eviction on the sole ground of default in rent. In
that case, the landlord merely serves his summons and complaint, and
no other notice to quit is required.760 Trial, in the superior court of
the county where the land is located, is to be fixed by the court no
more than ten days from the filing of the complaint.7 61 Service must
be made no less than five days before trial, and no continuance may
be had for over two days.7 62 At the trial the court examines the parties
orally and may then order restitution if it has no reasonable doubt
that the plaintiff is entitled to it. Should the court have doubt, it may
set the matter over for trial as an ordinary action.763 If the writ of res-
758. Young v. Riley, 59 Wn. 2d 50, 52, 365 P.2d 769 (1961); Sundholm v. Patch,
62 Wn. 2d 244, 382 P.2d 262 (1963); Chung v. Louie Fong Co., 130 Wash. 154, 226
P. 726 (1924); Carmack v. Drum, 27 Wash. 382, 67 P. 808 (1902); Phillips v. Port
Townsend Lodge No. 6, F. & A.M., 8 Wash. 529, 36 P. 476 (1894); Ralph v. Lomer,
3 Wash. 401. 28 P. 760 (1891); Income Properties Inv. Co. v. Trefethen, 155 Wash.
493, 284 P. 782 (1930); see text accompanying notes 730-33 spra.
759. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.410 (Supp. 1973).
760. Id.§ 59.08.010(1963).
761. Id. §§ 59.08.020 &.040.
762. Id. §§ 59.08.040 &.050.
763. Id. § 59.08.060.
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titution issues, the defendant may stay it and force the cause to trial
by posting a bond within three days.76 4 It is a statutory defense for the
landlord to accept rent after the default. 765 Only one decision has
been found under the chapter, and it adds little to what has been
said.766
E. Government Regulation of Evictions
Under this heading we will discuss the federal Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 1940.767 Whenever a dwelling is occupied by the
wife, children, or other dependents of a person in military service and
when the rent is $150 per month or less, eviction may be delayed as
long as three months. The landlord, assuming he knows the facts, is
required, under criminal penalties, to disclose the serviceman's
connection to the court in the eviction proceeding. 768 Unless the judge
finds the tenant's ability to pay rent is not "materially affected" by the
military service, he may stay proceedings as long as three months or
"may make such other order as may be just. '7 69
Other provisions of that Act allow a tenant who enters military ser-
vice after he became a tenant to terminate his tenancy.770 These provi-
sions cover leases not only of dwellings, but also of premises used for
professional, business, agricultural, "or similar" purposes. The ser-
viceman must have made the lease before he entered the service, and
either he or his dependents must have occupied the premises. To ter-
minate, he gives his landlord a written notice after he enters the ser-
vice. Termination is effective 30 days after the date of the next rental
payment if rent is payable monthly. Otherwise, termination occurs on
the last day of the next month. Under criminal penalties, the landlord
is forbidden to hold the tenant's effects, clothing, or furniture.
F. Tenant's Bankruptcy or Receivership
Of course the landlord may, by a lease clause, have the power to
terminate if the tenant becomes bankrupt or goes into receivership,
764. Id. § 59.08.070.
765. Id. § 59.08.010.
766. Neitsch v. Tyrrell, 25 Wn. 2d 303. 171 P.2d 241 (1946).
767. 50 U.S.C. §§ 501-90(1970).
768. Id. § 530(3).
769. Id. § 530(2).
770. Id. § 534.
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but that is not what we are considering at this point. Rather, we are
considering some provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. Within 30 days
after his qualification, the trustee in bankruptcy may elect to assume
or to "reject" (terminate) the lease. If he fails to assume it within that
period, he is deemed to have rejected it.7 71 His rejection is viewed as a
breach of the lease, but that Act specifically limits a lafidlord's dam-
ages for this breach to the sum of one year's rent from the date the
premises are surrendered to him.772 He has a claim in bankruptcy for
this amount, together, of course, with a claim for unpaid rent prior to
that date.773
One Washington case, Fotheringham v. Spokane Savings Bank,
774
touches upon the powers of a receiver to terminate a lease. Fother-
ingham holds that the state supervisor of banking, acting as statutory775
receiver for an insolvent bank, has the power, subject to court or-
der, to renounce and terminate a lease within a reasonable time after
his appointment. No decisions have been found on the subject under
the other receivership statutes, especially the general receivership act,
R.C.W. Chapter 7.60. However, in Fotheringham the court makes the
broad statement that "a receiver" has the power to reject.776
G. Surrender
The parties to a lease may certainly terminate it by a cancellation
agreement. Assuming they clearly express their mutual intent so to do,
the only issue that is apt to arise is whether they have complied with a
statute of frauds if one is applicable. Courts in jurisdictions other than
Washington have reached differing conclusions on this issue, de-
pending in part upon the language of their local statutes of frauds. A
frequent result has been that a cancellation agreement must be in
whatever form would be required to create a leasehold for the period of
771. Fed. Bankruptcy Rule 607, 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970). Until a recent
amendment in the Rules, the trustee might assume or reject the lease within 60 days
from the adjudication of bankruptcy or within 30 days after he qualified, whichever
was later. But the period is now only 30 days from qualification.
772. Id. §§ 103(a)(9) & (c).
773. Id. § 103(a)(9). Rent claims may have priority up to the amount of rent
accruing within three months before bankruptcy, but only if state law gives a priority
to rent claims, Id. § 104(a)(5),
774. 175 Wash. 169, 27 P.2d 139 (1933).
775. See WASH. REa.CoDa ch. 30.44 (1963).
776. 175 Wash. 169, 173,27 P.2d 139 (1933).
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time the tenant's leasehold has left to run.777 No Washington decision
has been found on this point. It has, however, been decided that an
oral month-to-month tenancy may be terminated by oral agreement,
at least if the tenant vacates. 778
Termination of a leasehold by surrender is, judging by the number
of cases, most likely to occur by a mode that sidesteps the statute-
of-frauds issue. The statute does not apply to transactions that
occur "by operation of law." Surrender by operation of law occurs in
Washington if the tenant voluntarily quits the premises with the intent
of abandoning the leasehold and the landlord re-enters and assumes
control for his own account. 779 Frequently the parties also have an
oral agreement that the leasehold shall end, but this should not be
necessary, as its function would seem to be merely to aid in character-
izing the tenant's intent on quitting and the landlord's purpose upon re-
entering.780 No intent to abandon, and so no surrender, occurs if the
tenant quits involuntarily. His quitting is not voluntary, for instance,
if he leaves because he is sent to prison or if he is forced out by
a writ of restitution issued wrongfully in an unlawful detainer action.781
On the other hand, a tenant's departure has been held voluntary
where he left of his own accord, though reluctantly and after an argu-
ment with the landlord. 782 According to dictum in one opinion, a
tenant may abandon the entire premises by quitting and abandoning a
portion.783 On the landlord's end, he must make substantial use of the
premises to assume control and consummate the surrender. His merely
parking a few automobiles on the premises or making minor altera-
777. 1 A.L.P. § 3.99.
778. Lynch v. Gruber. 39 Wn. 2d 99. 234 P.2d 529 (1951). See also Samson Inv.
Co. v. Thompson Furniture Co., 102 Wash. 661, 173 P. 627 (1918). which holds
that an agreement to reduce the rent does not constitute an agreement to cancel.
779. For examples of variations upon this fact pattern, see Moore v. Northwest
Fabricators, Inc.. 51 Wn. 2d 26. 314 P.2d 941 (1957): Yakima Valley Motors. Inc.
v. Webb Tractor & Equip. Co., 14 Wn. 2d 468. 128 P.2d 507 (1942): Exeter Co. v.
Samuel Martin, Ltd., 5 Wn. 2d 244, 105 P.2d 83 (1940): Sandberg v. Light. 55 Wash.
189, 104 P. 205 (1909): Hart v. Pratt, 19 Wash. 560. 53 P. 71 I(1898).
780. Termination by surrender was held to have occurred in the following cases
in which landlord and tenant had no express termination agreement: Moore v. North-
west Fabricators. Inc.. 51 Wn. 2d 26. 314 P.2d 941 (1957): Yakima Valley Motors.
Inc. v. Webb Tractor & Equip. Co.. 14 Wn. 2d 468, 128 P.2d 507 (1942).
781. Koenig v. Hansen, 39 Wn. 2d 506, 236 P.2d 771 (1951) (prison): Corman
v. Sanderson, 72 Wash. 627. 131 P. 198 (1913) (restitution).
782. Schuss v. Rice, 152 Wash. 538, 278 P. 428 (1929).
783. Carstens Packing Co. v. Lewis C. Troughton, Inc.. 90 Wash. 196. 155 P. 758
(1916) (dictum).
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tions to fit them for re-letting for the tenant's account have been held
not to be such substantial use.7 84
We have suggested there is no surrender unless the landlord
re-enters for "his own account," the implication being that he does not
complete the proffered surrender if he re-enters for "the tenant's ac-
count." When the tenant quits with the intent to abandon, he (by the
preferred theory) raises in the landlord a power in law either to accept
the surrender by re-entering for his own account or to re-let for the
tenant's account. If the landlord chooses the latter alternative, no ter-
mination by surrender occurs. To put himself in this posture, the land-
lord must notify the tenant that he intends to re-let for the tenant and
must make reasonable efforts to do so.78 5 The landlord must be
careful not to act contrary to the continuing existence of the tenant's
leasehold, or he will work a surrender. For instance, though no Wash-
ington decisions have been found on the point, other jurisdictions
have held that the landlord's re-letting for a term longer than the orig-
inal lease is inconsistent with it and causes a surrender. However, acts
necessary to re-letting for the tenant's account, such as accepting back
the keys, changing door locks, or making minor alterations have been
held in Washington not to effect surrender.786
So far we have said the landlord "may" elect to re-let for the ten-
ant's account. The 64-dollar question is, must he do so? Traditionally
the rule has been that he need not, but a growing minority trend holds
that the landlord "has a duty to mitigate the tenant's damages" by
re-letting. This is technically incorrect, for the landlord has no "duty"
for the breach of which the tenant could sue him; rather, the tenant has
a defense to the landlord's suit for rent if the landlord fails to mitigate.
The sensitive reader will recognize this as another of those deplorable
intrusions that contract law is making into the sacred preserves of real
property. There is a direct Washington holding that the landlord must
re-let when the tenant fails to take possession at the beginning of the
784. Pague v. Petroleum Prod., Inc., 77 Wn. 2d 219, 461 P.2d 317 (1969)
(parking autos); Washington Sec. Co. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 163 Wash. 338, 1 P.2d
236 (193 1) (minor alterations).
785. See Pollock v. Ives Theatres, Inc., 174 Wash. 65, 24 P.2d 396 (1933);
Washington Sec. Co. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 163 Wash. 338, 1 P.2d 236 (1931);
Brown v. Hayes, 92 Wash. 300, 159 P. 89 (1916).
786. Myers v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 75 Wn. 2d 133, 449 P.2d 104 (1969)
(keys, locks); Washington Sec. Co. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 163 Wash. 338, 1 P.2d
236 (1931) (alterations); Brown v. Hayes, 92 Wash. 300, 159 P. 89 (1916) (keys).
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term. 787 The 1973 Residential Landlord-Tenant Act expressly re-
quires mitigation for tenancies the Act covers. 788 For all other situa-
tions, i.e., when the tenant quits and abandons a leasehold not cov-
ered by the Act during the term, there is strong and repeated dictum
that the landlord must mitigate; 789 the landlord's lawyer should as-
sume his Washington client has this so-called duty.
Suppose now that the landlord has attempted to re-let the premises
for his tenant's account. What will be his measure of damages for the
tenant's abandonment and failure to pay the agreed rent to the end of
the term? If the landlord is unsuccessful in re-letting, despite his rea-
sonable efforts, he recovers the rent to the end of the term under
Washington decisions.7 90 Under the 1973 Residential Landlord-
Tenant Act, however, when he is unsuccessful, the landlord may re-
cover only the lesser of the agreed rent for the rest of the term or the
agreed rent for the period "reasonably necessary to re-rent the premises
at a fair rental, plus the difference between such fair rental and the
rent agreed to in the prior agreement. ' 791 In the event the landlord
successfully re-lets the premises at a rent lower than the original agreed
rent, the position taken in the Washington cases is that the landlord
may recover the difference between the new and the original rents for
the balance of the term. 79 2 The language quoted above from the Act,
of course, changes the measure of damages, so that the landlord un-
der residential tenancies covered by the Act recovers only the differ-
ence between the original rent and the fair rental value. No case has
been (or is apt to be) found deciding what happens if the landlord
re-lets for more than the original rent. In theory it seems he should
787. Peninsular Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. C. J. Breier Co.. 137 Wash. 641, 243 P. 830
(1926).
788. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.310(Supp. 1973).
789. Myers v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 75 Wn. 2d 133. 449 P.2d [04 (1969)
("assuming" landlord has "duty" to mitigate): Exeter Co. v. Samuel Martin. Ltd..
5 Wn. 2d 244. 105 P.2d 83 (1940) (dictum): Martin v. Siegley, 123 Wash. 683. 212
P. 1057 (1923) (dictum).
790. Myers v. Western Farmers Ass'n. 75 Wn. 2d 133. 449 P.2d 104 (1969):
Washington Sec. Co. v. Oppenheimer & Co.. 163 Wash. 338, 1 P.2d 236 (1931).
But cf. Pollock v. [ves Theatres. Inc.. 174 Wash. 65. 24 P.2d 396 (1933).
791. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.310(2)(a).(b)(Supp. 1973).
792. Exeter Co. v. Samuel Martin, Ltd., 5 Wn. 2d 244. 105 P.2d 83 (1940): Mar-
tin v. Siegley. 123 Wash. 683, 212 P. 1057 (1923): Brown v. Hayes. 92 Wash. 300.
159 P. 89 (1916). To its holding that the landlord recovered the difference between
old and new rents, the court added the qualification in dictum that this was so assum-
ing the fair rental value was more than the old rent.
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account to the old tenant for the overage, though in practice he would
suddenly decide he wanted to terminate the old lease after all. Also
undecided is the question whether the landlord may charge to the
tenant the reasonable costs of re-letting the premises, such as advertis-
ing, brokers' fees, and cleanup costs. One would suppose he may,
seeing that he is re-letting for the tenant's account and because of the
tenant's wrongful act. Interestingly, the 1973 Residential Act, as
passed by the legislature, would have allowed such costs, but the gov-
ernor item-vetoed the clause, creating a nice question of "legislative"
intentZ 93
Before we depart from the subject of surrender, there is a minor but
interesting connected question to consider. What should the landlord
do about personal items the tenant leaves on the premises when he
abandons? The landlord seemingly finds himself in the position of an
involuntary bailee, so that he owes some duty to care for the person-
alty. Presumably he could leave the items where they were, but this is
usually impractical. Washington has held that if the landlord removes
the chattels he has a duty to place them so that the tenant may, with
reasonable diligence, recover them uninjured. Where the landlord had
a tow truck haul off the tenant's vehicle and the towing company
imposed unreasonable conditions upon the tenant's recovering it, the
landlord was held liable for conversion.794
H. Merger
The doctrine of merger, of course, is not peculiar to landlord-
tenant law; it applies generally to estates in land. In essence, the
doctrine says that if one person acquires in separate transactions two
chronologically adjoining estates in land, the lesser one merges into
the larger, so that he has the estate that is the combination of the two.
This would occur in the landlord-tenant context, for instance, if the
tenant transferred his leasehold to the landlord, whose reversion in fee
would swell up to become a presently possessory fee. Or it might
occur the other way around if the tenant acquired the reversion.7 95
793. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.310(2)(6) (Supp. 1973).
794. Wilson v. Wilson, 53 Wn. 2d 13, 330 P.2d 178 (1958).
795. Rayburn v. Stewart-Calvert Co., 105 Wash. 570, 178 P. 454 (1919) (dictum).
See also Holzer v. Rhodes, 24 Wn. 2d 184, 163 P.2d 811 (1945).
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The essence of merger being that one person must have adjoining es-
tates, no merger occurs if he acquires two interests in the same land
but another interest, which he does not have, comes between them.7 96
It would seem possible for a tenant to have a merger into a fractional
share of the fee by acquiring a fractional tenancy in common interest
in the reversion. One Washington decision implicitly suggests that the
tenant would have a merger only as to his fractional share, but as to
the other owners' shares no merger would occur; he would still owe
them their shares of the rent. 797
The merger doctrine is subject to the major qualification that
merger of the two estates does not occur if it would be contrary to the
intent of that transferor and transferee or, apparently, contrary solely
to the intent of the transferor. What seems to be a frequent applica-
tion of that qualification is made when the tenant has made a sublease
and then the landlord and head tenant voluntarily terminate the head
tenancy. Strict merger theory would tell us that the landlord ends up
with a possessory fee, and that the subtenant is squeezed out. Such
was the result under an 18th-century English decision, but American
cases reach a contrary result, and this result has also been changed in
England by statute.798 Washington has a decision to the same effect;
voluntary termination of the head lease does not terminate the sub-
lease, though the landlord's exercise of a power to terminate the head
lease does.79 In other situations in which the parties do not intend a
merger, none occurs. If the tenant purchases the reversion under a
contract that provides the purchase will not affect the lease, there is
no merger. 800 It is possible for the tenant to purchase the reversion at
a foreclosure sale or for the landlord to take back a release of the
lease without working a merger if his statements and actions show he
intended to hold the interests separately.8 0 ' One is impressed after
examining the cases that the Washington Supreme Court has not fa-
796. E.g., no merger occurs in a landlord if his tenant of a term for years trans-
fers back to him a term shorter than the estate for years: the tenant has a leasehold
reversion that intervenes between the sublease back to the landlord and the landlord's
reversion in fee. Tolsma v. Adair, 32 Wash. 383, 73 P. 347 (1903).
797. See Brydges v. Millionaire Club, Inc., 15 Wn. 2d 714. 132 P.2d 188 (1942).
798. 1 A.L.P. § 3.100.
799. Cuschner v. Westlake. 43 Wash. 690. 86 P. 948 (1906).
800. Rayburn v. Stewart-Calvert Co., 105 Wash. 570, 178 P. 454(1919).
801. Parks v. Lepley. 160 Wash. 287, 294 P. 1020 (1931) (foreclosure sale):
McGinley v. Cannon. 90 Wash. 3 11, 155 P. 1047 (1916) (release of lease).
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vored mergers-the court has in fact been sensitive to finding a con-
trary intent.
L Expiration of Landlord's Estate
A leasehold estate is, of course, carved out of a larger estate, as the
word "larger" is understood in the law of estates. Usually the larger
estate is a fee simple absolute, in which event the problem we are here
discussing could arise, in strict theory, only if that estate escheated or
was extinguished by adverse possession. American Law of Property
takes the position that foreclosure of a mortgage against the landlord's
fee will terminate the leasehold by terminating the fee.802 That result
seems incorrect, because the foreclosure sale transfers, but does not
terminate, the fee; if the leasehold is terminated, it is by virtue of its
being subject to the mortgage.
If a leasehold is carved out of an estate with a duration less than
that of a fee, such as a life estate, determinable fee, or fee upon condi-
tion subsequent, it seems clear the leasehold will be cut off by the ex-
piration of that estate. The only Washington decision found on the
point says, though it seems to be dictum, that a leasehold created by a
life tenant will fall in at the end of the life tenancy.803 In other words,
while a life tenant, etc., may execute a 999-year lease, the leasehold
will fall in when his estate ends. We previously saw the same principle
at work in the rule that a sublease is cut, short if the head landlord,
exercising a power of termination, ends the head lease.
J. Death of a Party
American courts generally have held that the death of neither land-
lord nor tenant terminates the leasehold. 804 This surely is the Wash-
ington rule, though perhaps direct authority is incomplete. A section
of the probate code, R.C.W. § 11.04.250, provides that heirs and de-
visees of reversionary interests are entitled to receive rents, which
must imply that the landlord's death does not terminate the leasehold.
In re Barclay's Estate805 holds that the deceased tenant's interest is an
802. 1 A.L.P. § 3.101.
803. Kerns v. Pickett, 47 Wn. 2d 184, 287 P.2d 88 (1955).
804. 1 A.L.P. § 3.102.
805. 1 Wn. 2d 82, 95 P.2d 393 (1939).
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immovable chattel real, taxable for death taxes at the situs of the land.
Perhaps there is a suggestion here that the tenant's interest passes to
the decedent's descendants or beneficiaries.
K. Destruction of Premises
The traditional common-law rule is that, because a leasehold is an
estate in land, destruction of a building on the premises does not ter-
minate the leasehold. To this American courts have generally made
an exception that destruction of a larger building of which the de-
mised premises were a part (an apartment or office) will work the end
of the leasehold. 80 6 Washington has held that destruction of one of
several structures on the leased land does not cause termination-that
the tenant's duty to pay the full rent continues.8 07 In strong dictum,
however, the Washington court said that the destruction of an entire
office or apartment building will terminate the tenancies of individual
units.808 Under the 1973 Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, because
the landlord has a duty to maintain the premises in condition fit for
human habitation, destruction of the premises would seem to give the
tenant a power to terminate, though termination would not occur au-
tomatically. 809
Presumably parties may find these legal rules unsatisfactory and
may want to draft against the possibility of destruction. Typical
clauses may allow the tenant to terminate if destruction is of a certain
portion of the premises or if it makes the premises "untenantable" or
some such formula. A Washington decision holds that, under a clause
allowing the tenant to terminate if the premises are rendered "unten-
antable and unfit for occupancy," he may not exercise the power until
he has given the landlord a reasonable time to repair.810 In connection
with a destruction clause, the parties may also wish to provide a for-
mula for repair of casualty damage that does not completely destroy
or make the premises unusable.
806. 1 A.L.P. § 3.103.
807. Anderson v. Ferguson, 17 Wn. 2d 262. 135 P.2d 302(1943).
808. Anderson v. Ferguson. 17 Wn. 2d 262, 135 P.2d 302 (1943) (dictum):
Porter v. Tull, 6 Wash. 408, 33 P. 965 (1893) (dictum because parties conceded the
point).
809. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.060, .070, & .090(Supp. 1973).
810. Mottman Merc. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co.. 3 Wn. 2d 62, 100 P.2d 16
(1940).
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L. Frustration of Purpose
In contract law there is a doctrine known as "frustration of purpose"
or "commercial frustration," sometimes also considered a form of
impossibility of performance. Typically the doctrine is invoked when
a contract for a certain purpose, legal when made, becomes illegal or
at least unprofitable by reason of supervening laws or governmental
restrictions. As a comparatively recent development, some American
courts have applied this doctrine in the landlord-tenant context.81'
The several Washington decisions on the question might be referred
to as the "prohibition" cases. In the leading 1916 case of Stratford,
Inc., v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. 812 the lease restricted use of
the premises to a saloon. When a state statute prohibited the sale of
alcoholic beverages, this was held to terminate the leasehold. Al-
though the premises could still have been used for a cigar stand and
cafe, the use had become unprofitable enough to frustrate the purpose
of the lease. Two other decisions followed Stratford.8 13 As a matter of
principle, there is no frustration of purpose and no termination if the
lease merely permits, but does not require, the illegal use. Thus, no
termination occurred when the lease said the premises "may" be used
as a saloon.814 We ought to note, though, that the Washington court
has, in this area, applied a fairly relaxed test of what is a restrictive
use. The phrase "for the purposes of conducting a saloon" has been
held restrictive.8 15 In other contexts a purpose clause would likely not
be held restrictive unless it contained the word "only" or some equiva-
lent.
No Washington case has been found applying the frustration doc-
trine other than in the saloon context. But there seems no reason it
would not be applied in other contexts if the ingredients of the doc-
trine were present: the tenant's use being restricted to certain activi-
ties, those activities subsequently becoming illegal, and the tenant's
use thereby being rendered impossible or largely unprofitable.
811. 1 A.L.P. § 3.104.
812. 94 Wash. 125, 162 P. 31 (1916).
813. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 98 Wash.
12, 167 P. 58 (1917); Shepard v. Sullivan, 94 Wash. 134, 162 P. 34 (1916).
814. Yesler Estate, Inc. v. Continental Dist. Co., 99 Wash. 480, 169 P. 967 (1918);
Hayton v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 66 Wash. 248, 119 P. 739 (1911).
815. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 98 Wash.
12, 167 P. 58 (1917).
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XII. EPILOGUE
When the author reaches this happy point in an article, he generally
appends a summary of what he has written. That will not do in this
case, for in truth the whole article is but a summary. Instead, I claim
the privilege to comment at large upon Washington landlord-tenant
law or, rather, upon one current in it that now runs very strong.
We accept from frequent repetition the assertion that our ancient
and received law favors the landlord over the tenant. The reference is
most often meant with regard to the legal principles governing main-
tenance and repair. To put a finer edge on it, we mean the lack of
legal principle; the law traditionally left the parties where it found
them, neither party having a duty of repair, except, if it be an excep-
tion, for the tenant's duty to prevent waste. However that may be, the
practical tendency of the law has not been to encourage either party
to repair. Certainly the landlord does not gain by this tendency, but it
is the tenant who most immediately and obviously bears the brunt of
living in unrepaired premises. And the impact is more profound on a
residential or office tenant, especially one having a short term, than
on an agricultural tenant. And so, there is considerable force to the
assertion that our common law favors the landlord if it is understood
to mean that the modern tenant, who is likely to be a householder, is
affected more unfavorably by the traditional law of repairs than was
the medieval tenant, who was generally an agriculturist.
It is not my purpose to refute the conclusion just reached, neither to
derogate from it. However, I must add-and this is a momentary di-
version from the main theme-that the statement that the "law" fa-
vors landlord over tenant cannot be taken generally. The Supreme
Court of Washington has tended through its history, and markedly so
in recent years, to favor tenants. The doctrine that leases shall be con-
strued against the drafter, who has been the landlord in the cases, has
been applied with vigor. Armstrong v. Maybee's 1 6 common-law rule
that a general repair clause obligates a tenant to rebuild burned struc-
tures has been much watered down.81 7 University Properties, Inc. v.
Moss, 818 perhaps the most unexpected landlord-tenant decision in the
816. 17 Wash. 24, 48 P. 737 (1897).
817. See Part I. section V-B, 49 WASH. L. REV. at 359-63.
818. 63 Wn. 2d 619, 388 P.2d 543 (1964).
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state, allowed a tenant to "rescind" a leasehold. On the basis of re-
peated strong dictum and holdings partially covering the doctrine,
Washington almost surely subscribes to the doctrine that a landlord
must mitigate damages by attempting to re-let if he wants to recover
rent from his tenant after the tenant has abaridoned the premises.819
In Thomas v. Housing Authority820 and McCutcheon v. United
Homes Corp.,821 the Washington court outlawed clauses in housing
leases exculpating the landlord from liability for negligence. The most
recent leading landlord-tenant opinion, in Foisy v. Wyman,822 not
only created an implied warranty of habitability but decimated some
long-settled rules in other areas, all in a manner displaying heavy pro-
tenant leanings. No doubt some antitenant decisions could be mar-
shalled, though they would tend to be older ones. But, based upon the
examples given and others that could be given, as well as upon general
impressions from reading all the cases, I have no doubt the Wash-
ington court has increasingly favored tenants in the sense that it has
tended to alter received rules of law to reach results favorable to their
argued positions in litigation with landlords.
Therefore, while I will concede that the traditional rule governing
repairs tends to produce an effect unfavorable to the residential and
office tenant as compared with the effect on the landlord and on the
agricultural tenant, I can accept no more general understanding of the
proposition that the law favors landlord over tenant. With that limita-
tion understood and explained, let us return to the main theme.
Because the public's interest, as well as the tenant's, is served, so
most of us think, by having housing in repair, one may justify state
intervention in the matter of repairs. State action to this end might
take a number of forms, the most obvious of which is to require by
law that the "owner" maintain a certain condition of repair. In the
landlord-tenant context the onus might logically be put upon either
party; as far as the public's own interest is concerned, it is a matter of
indifference which party bears the burden. In enacting the 1973 Resi-
dential Landlord-Tenant Act, the Washington legislature placed the
direct burden of repair on the landlord. Reasons may be adduced for
819. See section XI-G supra.
820. 71 Wn. 2d 69, 426 P.2d 836 (1967).
821. 79Wn.2d443,486P.2d1093(1971).
822. 83 Wn. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
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this choice, such as that most landlords have a more permanent
connection than most tenants with the premises and that landlords
have superior means to make repairs. I suspect that most who advo-
cated and voted for the Act had a more compelling, if subliminal and
attitudinal, motive: they wanted to help out tenants, particularly
lower-income ones, who were suffering the ill effects of rundown
housing. I suspect a similar motive inspired the members of the court
in Foisy v. Wyman. In this attempt to aid the tenant there is a fallacy,
and from this attempt is liable to come a great disillusionment.
So far as the 1973 Residential Landlord-Tenant Act succeeds, that
far will it produce repairs that, under the former common-law rule,
would not have been made. One may wonder if the Act will have any
more effect on housing disrepairs than have the various local housing
codes we have had for years, but let us assume it will produce many
new repairs. Who will pay for them? The landlord. And where does he
get his money? Unless one assumes the landlord formerly produced a
lot of excess profit that he can and will devote to repairs, he can get
money for the new repairs only by raising the tenant's rent. I do not
believe landlords are making sufficient excess profits to make signifi-
cantly more new repairs. The most realistic "study" of which I know
was conducted by a New York eleemosynary organization that, with
some $250,000 of Rockefeller money, purchased, refurbished, and
operated a tenement house that they tried to keep in good repair.
After four years they abandoned the project, concluding it was impos-
sible for even a nonprofit group to generate enough rent to keep it in
repair.8 23 I judge therefore that the only way significant new repairs
can be made is from increased rent.
Several scenarios may play out after this point. In one the tenant
simply cannot come up with the money for the increased rent, and he
must move. Assuming this is multiplied many times, it shrinks the
supply of available housing and forces tenants into cheaper, and pre-
sumably generally lower quality, housing if such is available. It also
causes the landlord vacancies and a lowered rental income, which has
its repercussions. Another scenario presupposes the tenant is able to
pay the increased rent. The question is, where will he get fresh money
for this? Some tenants may be able to divert income that they pre-
viously spent for some other purpose-entertainment would be a likely
823. New York Times. March 9, 1967, at I, col. 4.
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candidate. However, the tenants we are most apt to be concerned
with, because they are most apt to be living in rundown housing that
will require the most extensive refurbishing, will tend to have the
lowest incomes and, often, to be receiving public assistance. These
persons, assuming still that they will pay the increased rent, will not
have much discretionary spending to shift to the increased rent and
will have to have increased income. Whether this increase comes from
salary or from welfare payments, society will have ultimately to pick
up the bill, which means resources will shift from other uses to rents,
and then to housing repairs. A third scenario ends up with large
amounts of what is now the lower quality of private housing simply
going off the market and being replaced with publicly-owned housing
projects. In any scenario that can be imagined, society has made a
decision to spend more of its finite resources for housing repairs;
nothing comes free.
Much as I suspect this conclusion has not been thought through
very deeply by some advocates of landlord-tenant reform and ought to
be explored, that is not the chief point to which I want to move. The
chief point is anterior to the scenarios just played out and is in a sense
simpler, but in a sense more profound. It is merely this: by changing
the rules on housing repairs, the tenant has not gained. He has not lost
either, but those who no doubt thought they were shifting the scales
from the landlord's side to the tenant's are frustrated. Why? As be-
tween landlord and tenant, it is true, the landlord now has a new duty
to provide X dollars' worth of repairs, and the tenant has the benefit
of those repairs. But, again as between landlord and tenant, the tenant
will pay X dollars more, so that his burden equals his benefit. That is
not the legal effect of changing the repair rules, but it is the practical
effect.
The reasons why legal and practical effects do not coincide are easy
to see. Rules of law are not the only force, and apparently not the ulti-
mate force, operating in the landlord-tenant relation. In the case we
have put, economic forces seem to have the last word. Law is not by a
great deal the only game in town. Yet I infer there are a lot of sincere
persons who believe-at least they act as if they believe-the law can
solve large and deep-seated problems that plague us. They load the
processes of the law with a burden they cannot bear. In this I see an
example of a misconception that pervades much of our current
thinking about the law and its uses.
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It is the passion of our age to regard the law as the golden
met-wand for transforming society. For we laborers in the law to
harbor such speculations is vanity, in both senses of the word, and I
foresee a generation of disappointed cynics. The great troubles of so-
ciety require for their solutions the expenditure of vast energies. Law
has not within it any creative force. It is a regulator, not a creator. It
can be very useful in mobilizing and directing existing energies to the
accomplishing of some goal; I do not mean to discountenance its use
in that regard. But as we see from the example of landlord and tenant,
the force of the law is really a fragile thing and liable to be overcome
by forces more primal. We must keep in mind that law interacts with
these forces, so that the end effect of changing the rule of law may not
be at all what the rule states. I fear we do not keep that in mind as
consistently as we ought. In the final analysis perhaps all I am urging
is more humility, especially from our lawgivers, as to the uses of law.
We have it from the Great Lawgiver himself that, 824
laws were like cobwebs-for that if any trifling or powerless thing fell
into them, they held it fast; but if a thing of any size fell into them,
it broke the meshes and escaped.
ERRATA
The following changes should be made in the text of Part I of this
article, which commenced at 49 WASH. L. REV. 291:
1. At page 357, the second full sentence on the page should read:
"The landlord gets the entire condemnation award, except that if the
agreed rent is less than fair market rent, the tenant is entitled to the
difference between those amounts for the balance of the term."
2. At pages 370-7 1, the last sentence on 370 and the first full sen-
tence on 371 indicate that variations may be made only if approved
by either the county prosecutor's office or the Consumer Protection
Division of the Attorney General's office. There is a third alternative,
that variations may be approved by the tenant's lawyer. Certainly this
third alternative is much more apt to be used than either of the other
two. That, however, does not much alter the writer's conclusion that
Section 36 of the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act will hardly be
used.
824. 1 Diogenes Laertius. TIlE LIVES AND OPINIONS OFi EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS at
28 (C.D. Yonge trans. 1901) (Solon).
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